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Canada's Business Immigration Program was enacted as part of
the Immigration Act' as a way to promote, encourage, and facilitate the
immigration of experienced business persons who can contribute to
Canada's economic growth by applying risk capital and business acumen
to Canadian business ventures that create jobs for Canadians.2 There are
three categories of immigrants in the Business Immigration Program:
entrepreneurs, the self-employed, and investors. This Note will analyze the
Immigrant Investor Program (Program) established for international
investors, being the most recent addition to Canada's complex Business
Immigration Program.
Through the Program, permanent residency3 can be gained if a per-
spective immigrant has obtained a net worth of at least $500,000'
through his own endeavors and has successfully passed the medical and
security tests applicable to all immigrants entering Canada.5 Additionally,
the foreigner agrees to transfer a minimum of $250,0006 to a govern-
" J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1995). The
author especially thanks Professor Henry T. King, Jr. and Christian M. Williams for
their advice and guidance, and gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Canadian,
Hong Kong, and Taiwanese practitioners and governmental officials who responded to
inquiries and provided comments by letter or telephone.
I Immigration Act, S.C., ch. 52, 1976-1977 (1976) (Can.).
2 EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, IMMIGRATION MANUAL, reprinted in
PAC. RIM INVESTMENT & Bus. IMMGR. 1.1.01 (Continuing Legal Education Society of
British Columbia, 1989).
- Permanent residents (also called landed immigrants) have the right to come into
Canada and remain in Canada unless the immigrant remains outside Canada for more
than six months in any twelve-month period or performs certain criminal acts. If an
immigrant has been in Canada for three years as a permanent resident, that person may
apply to become a Canadian citizen. Only Canadian citizenship affords the highest order
of rights to a person. Permanent residents, for example, cannot fully participate in the
political process, cannot hold some forms of property, and cannot occupy certain
professions. THE ANNOTATED 1994 IMMIGRATION Acr OF CANADA 107-135 (Frank N.
Marrocco & Henry M. Goslett eds., 1993).
4 All figures are in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted.
5 SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3443.
6 Originally, an investment of $150,000 for a period of three years was possible.
359
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
ment-accepted business investment fund or syndicate fund, which pools
money from numerous investors and invests in two or more businesses
that are of substantial economic benefit to Canada.7
Ridden with controversy since its inception in 1986, all new invest-
ments into the Program were halted on November 1, 1994, while new
and more comprehensive regulations are developed to prevent further
Program abuse. As part of a comprehensive review of Canada's general
immigration policy, Citizenship and Immigration Canada intends to
replace the current Program in 1996 with a revised investor program,
pending extensive consultation with a special advisory panel which is
studying ways to enhance economic benefits and reduce program abuse.8
To help understand why this moratorium was issued, this Note will
first provide a brief historical sketch of the immigration policies upon
which the Program was founded and outline the Program's design and its
practical application to potential immigrant investors. Second, this Note
will focus on past monitoring and enforcement problems found in the
Program's framework. Special emphasis will be given to recent impropri-
eties in Manitoba as representative of occurrences across Canada. This
Note will then analyze the 1993 regulatory changes which provide the
Program with statutory underpinnings that give Ottawa more control over
monitoring and enforcing the patchwork of provincial immigration poli-
cies. Moreover, this Note will show how the government could place
greater emphasis on creating economic development in rural provincial
areas and developing better techniques for keeping investment opportuni-
ties in the province for which they were intended. Finally, while numer-
ous improvements to the Program could be explored,9 this Note will
A 1990 amendment to Immigration Regulations, 1978 increased this investment level.
See SOR/90-750, 1990, C. Gaz. Part II, at 4888. Those funds that began marketing
activities before this amendment was enacted were permitted to continue offering
investments at the lower minimum levels.
7 SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3411-13.
8 CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Cat. No. MP43-332/1994E, INTO THE
21ST CENTURY: A STRATEGY FOR IMMIGRATION AND CrrizENSHP 32 (1994). See also
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Cat. No. MP43-330/1994E, A BROADER
VISION: IMMIGRATION AND CrrIZENSH" 15 (1994).
9 Major considerations include the combination of the Investor and Entrepreneur
categories, changing the tier differential, and increasing organizational efficiency. These
topics will only be discussed tangentially in this Note. Two comprehensive studies con-
ducted by the Canadian government came to such conclusions. See generally THE
MINISTERIAL TASK FORCE ON THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAM - A DISCUSSION
DOcuMENT (1992) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]; Canada, House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, Interim Report on the Immigrant
Investor Program, Issue No. 21 (1992) [hereinafter Interim Report] (conducting,
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argue that in order for the Program to be a viable option for potential
immigrants in years to come, the illusion of a seal of governmental
guarantee must be dispelled and more efficient regulations must be
enacted. If these and other potential concerns are incorporated into the
new investor program to be introduced in 1996, the Immigrant Investor
Program's tarnished image abroad may be restored and its potential
economic benefits could be shared more equally by Canadians in all
provinces.
If. A PRELIMINARY ILLUSTRATION
The following example illustrates the type of problems that have
become commonplace with the Program. Controversy arose in Alberta
concerning an investment fund named Western Canadian Shopping
Centres (Western Canadian) which was started by the Alberta
government's former head of business immigration in Hong Kong."
After being approved by federal and provincial authorities in 1988,
Western Canadian was marketed in Asia as an investment fund which
would jointly invest money from numerous immigrant investors in
shopping mall construction projects. The fund manager collected a total
of $34 million from over two hundred Asian investors. Instead of build-
ing malls, the money was invested in a gold mine in northern Saskatche-
wan - without investors' approval and in clear disregard of the investors'
reasonable expectations.' From the beginning, cost over-runs, production
pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an informative and comprehensive review of the
Investor category of the Business Immigration Program, in particular a study of the rec-
ommendations of the Ministerial Task Force).
"o Before founding Western Canadian, Joe Dutton served as executive secretary to
former Alberta premier Peter Lougheed and served as the Alberta government's former
head of business immigration for Asia. Timeline of Events: The Money Trail: From
Asia to Saskatchewan, CALwARY HERALD, Mar. 29, 1992, at A2.
" Western Canadian's initial offering memorandum stated that the fund's objective
was investment in commercial, non-residential, income-producing property on a turn key
basis. Though not a true investment syndicate or "blind pool," the fund managers had
discretion as to where to invest, within several possible options. After investors had
subscribed to the fund, Western Canadian amended its offering memorandum to include
the possibility of investment in industrial operations. Telephone interview with Geoffrey
L.K. Yeung, immigration lawyer with Chen & Leung, Vancouver (Jan. 22, 1995)
[hereinafter Yeung Interview]. (Mr. Yeung is the lawyer representing the immigrant
investors in the Western Canadian law suit.)
A problem, however, was that this change was not clearly stated in Western
Canadian's promotional materials and its name allowed investors to infer that funds
would be invested in shopping centers. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Commit-
tee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,
1995]
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delays, and insufficient gold reserves made it certain that investors would
be unable to recoup their investment. In December 1991, the fund ceased
to pay investors their semi-annual ten percent interest payments. 2 Mean-
while, the fund manager made a three million dollar profit by selling the
investment fund to the owner of the gold mine, Claude Resources Inc.
The fund went bankrupt and a law suit was brought by the immigrant
investors against the fund manager and eleven other parties. 3
The activities of Western Canadian displayed the following: non-
disclosure of material information and misrepresentation in both marketing
information and the offering memorandum's investment objectives; failure
of the fund to meet cash-back obligations to the investors; failure of the
provincial and federal government to monitor project development; failure
of the government to ensure that investments would create economic
development in the expected province; failure of the government to
prevent excessive monetary gains by fund managers; and lack of govern-
mental responsibility after an apparent "seal of approval" was given by
the government in initially approving the fund. Western Canadian's much-
publicized course of events is not an isolated incident in Canada. 4
It will be shown that most immigrants are attracted to the Program
Issue No. 17 (10 June 1992), at 17:53 [hereinafter House of Commons, Issue No. 17].
See, e.g., Anne Swardson, Visas for Sale! (Count Your Fingers); Canadian Migrant
Program Under Fire From Some Who Got Burned, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1993, at
A12.
12 Peter Kennedy, Seabee's Mill Built with Money Meant for Shopping Malls,
PREDICASTS, May 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, PWORLD File.
"3 Alan Boras, Immigrant Investors Sue Dutton, 11 Others, CALGARY HERALD, May
27, 1992, at Al. Defendants included Bennett Jones Verchere (Dutton's lawyers), Ernst
& Young (his accountants), The Royal Trust Company, Cominco Engineering Services
Ltd. (a mining engineering company) and Claude Resources Inc. Id. After a five-month
investigation, the Alberta Securities Commission decided it would not prosecute on its
own behalf. ASC Declines to Prosecute, PREDICASTS, Aug. 31, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, PWORLD File.
" While the precise facts of each impropriety may differ, Western Canadian is
representative of many similar events and illustrative of many problems with Canada's
Immigrant Investor Program. As Robert Wenman, chairperson of the Standing Commit-
tee on Labour, Employment and Immigration said ". . . [w]e can also learn from nega-
tive examples. Can you think of a more classic one than Western Canadian if we were
to really call for the government to look into something and ask what went wrong
here?" House of Commons, Issue No. 17, supra note 11, at 17:90. See generally David
Baines, Investor - Immigrant Fraud, 12 EQUrrY Oct. 9, 1994, at 32; Peter D. Fairey,
Immigrant Investor Program - Where It's At, Where It's Going, in INBOUND INVEST-
MENT INTO CANADA: PEOPLE AND MONEY 1.3, 1.3.17-19 (Continuing Legal Education
Society of British Columbia, ed. 1992).
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because of a number of illusions that are propagated by the spell of the
agent who sells the investment fund and by bureaucratic confusion
between federal and provincial governments. These illusions include
perceptions of ease; lack of time commitment to the business before and
after investing; the ability to "buy one's way into Canada"; the ability to
reside outside Canada for extended periods of time without losing one's
permanent residency status or the ability to obtain citizenship; and the
belief that projects are very "safe" because they are government-approved,
or worse still, a belief that they are "guaranteed" by the government. 5
These are the myths that must be dispelled for the Program to work
effectively and efficiently, meeting both the expectations of the Canadian
government and the foreign investors.
Various government study groups and parliamentary committees have
been set up since 1992 to study the Program's design and identify its
shortcomings. 6 Bill C-86 was introduced in 1993 in light of these study
groups as a way to correct past Program abuses. 7 The 1993 regulatory
changes mainly codified the already existing Program guidelines into
enforceable regulations and enacted new provisions restricting passive
investments in real estate." The amendments also addressed in a limited
fashion the ineffectiveness of both federal and provincial governmental
monitoring of privately administered investment funds and business
ventures. 9
These changes, however, appear to be only token efforts to correct
the sort of problems that transpired at Western Canadian. Nothing was
done to dispel the illusion of governmental approval and little was done
to ensure greater regional economic development. At a time when the
Program has become Canada's primary source of venture capital, these
regulations were too little, too late.
"s Questionnaire completed by Norris Yang, partner with Yang & Company, Hong
Kong in Association with the Vancover-based Canadian barristers and solicitors of
Boughton Peterson Yang Anderson (Feb. 16, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Yang Questionnaire]. See infra Section IX.
6 In 1992, upon being appointed the Minister of Employment & Immigration, the
Honorable Bernard Valcourt appointed a Task Force to examine all aspects of the
Program and recommend new approaches to ensure that the Program reached its full
potential. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 9. The House of Commons then reviewed the
findings of the Task Force and released its own report on the Program. Interim Report,
supra note 9. More recently, a special advisory panel was established in 1994 to study
the Program. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
17 SOR/78-172, 1978, C. Gaz. Part II, 757.
" SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3443.
I9 d. at 3443-44.
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IX. CANADA'S IMIGRATION HISTORY
The purpose of giving this brief historical background is to show the
historical basis for Canada's current Business Immigration Program and
to highlight Canada's continued doctrinal emphasis on immigrant selectivi-
ty and economic benefit.
Canadian officials have never minced words over their right to limit
and regulate the flow of immigrants into the country. Prime Minister
Mackenzie King said in 1921, "I wish to make it quite clear that Canada
is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as
desirable future citizens. It is not a 'fundamental human right' of an alien
to enter Canada. It is a privilege.""0 This sentiment was echoed again in
1955 by Citizenship and Immigration Minister J. W. Pickersgill when he
said,
Immigration isn't a matter of right at all... Only a Canadian has a
right to enter Canada. For everyone else it is a privilege which we have
a perfect right to grant or deny as we see fit. When an alien applies for
permission to come to Canada, he isn't on trial in a court, he is like
someone applying for membership into a club."
More recently, court decisions' and official statements concerning refu-
gee policy choices' reinforce the government's continued position that
immigration into Canada is a privilege and not a right. While such a
stance is embraced by many countries around the world, this continued
emphasis on immigrant control developed notwithstanding the fact that
since its founding, Canada has required a large number of immigrants to
populate its sizable land mass.24
20 JEAN BRUCE, AFTER THE WAR 18 (1982).
2 Fred Bodsworth, What's Behind the Immigration Wrangle, MACLEAN's, May 14,
1955, at 11-13, 127-30.
22 Bhadauria v. M.M.I., 1 F.C. 229 (1978); R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison,
ex parte Azam, 2 All E.R. 741 (1973); Koula Gana v. M.M.I., S.C.R. 699 (1970);
Masella v. Langlais, S.C.R. 263, 281 (1955) (emphasizing "Immigration to Canada by
persons other than Canadian citizens or those having a Canadian domicile is a privilege
determined by statute, regulation or otherwise, and is not a matter of right.").
' As Bernard Valcourt, then Immigration Minister, commented on a proposed joint
immigration policy among Canada, the United States, and Mexico: "Why should I, in
Canada, be caught up with this whole thing [refugee determination] when I could
simply direct [refugees] back where they belong or where they come through, the
United States." Estanislao Oziewicz, Canada Seeking to Stem Flow of Refugee Claim-
ants, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 17, 1991, at Al.
24 Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Immigration Law and Policy: A Study in Politics,
Demographics and Economics, 16 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 59, 60-65 (1990).
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As a dominion of the United Kingdom and the northern neighbor of
the United States, getting immigrants was not a problem.' The difficulty
experienced in the early years of Canadian immigration policy was how
to attract enough settlers to fill its vast western expanse (so as not to lose
land to the United States), while being able to be selective enough to
prevent the degeneration of Canadian society or the "pollution of the
country's racial stock." Traditional concerns related to immigrants in-
dude: taking jobs from Canadians and causing unemployment; crowding
in the cities and creation of city slums; straining social services; and
contributing to a rising crime rate.' This discriminatory bias in Canada's
immigration policy was sustained by a widespread ignorance of and
prejudice towards visible minorities.'
The Empire Settlement Act of 192229 enabled other dominions of
the United Kingdom to be a substantial source of immigrants for Canada.
The common perception of this Act, however, was that although it would
be likely to ensure the stability and growth of British values in Cana-
da,3" it would attract a great number of paupers. It was generally be-
lieved that the Act "would produce a great many settlers who are not
likely to make a success on the land and who would give [the] country
a black eye."'
' See generally John Schultz, Leaven for the Lump: Canada and Empire Settlement,
1918-1939, in EMIGRANTS AND EMPIRE: BRITISH SErrLEMENT IN THE DOMINIONS BE-
TWEEN THE WARS 150 (Stephen Constantine ed., 1990) [hereinafter Schultz, Leaven for
the Lump] (providing a full account of early migration patterns to Canada).
' Id. at 150-51. Canadians have perhaps been most xenophobic about Asians. This
prejudice culminated in The Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, S.C., ch. 38 (1923)
(Can.), which instituted a ban on Chinese immigrants. It was not until 1947 that this
Act was repealed. In the 1940s and especially the 1950s many discriminatory laws
were repealed, but it was not until the 1970s that all racist laws and regulations were
stricken from Canada's law books. This is not to say that discriminatory practices have
completely ceased, but certainly such activities are frowned upon and are not part of
the everyday experience in Canadian immigration practices. See JULIUS H. GREY, IMMI-
GRATION LAW IN CANADA 14 (1984). See generally ASHKAN HAsHEMIV, CONTROL AND
INADMISSABILITY IN CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (1993); RuTH CAMERON, THE
WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF: CANADIAN RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY 1905-1911
(1978); JOHN A. MUNRO, BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE "CHINESE EVIL": CANADA'S
FIRST ANTI-ASIATIC IMMIGRATION LAW (1971).
2 See THE LAW UNION OF ONTARIO, CANADA'S NEW IMMIGRATION ACT: A GUIDE
AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY 10-13 (1978) (emphasizing that immigrants became easy
scapegoats for problems caused by troubles in Canada's economy).
' HASHEMI, supra note 26, at 3-8.
29 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 13 (1922).
o Schultz, Leaven for the Lump, supra note 25, at 150.
3' Immigration Branch, C.O. Cory to R. Greenway, June 1, 1921,
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Canada's solution to this perceived problem, even at that early time,
was to envision ways to encourage well-off British people to settle in the
dominion to encourage provincial economic development. It was suggest-
ed, for example, by the Ontario Association of Boards of Trade in 1921,
that an adjustment of the Income Tax Act would encourage wealthy Eng-
lishmen to migrate and invest in the development of Canada.32 For the
same purpose, the Western Canada Colonization Association (WCCA) was
organized by wealthy land speculators and railroad companies. This acted
as an early type of investment fund to facilitate immigrant investment in
Canada.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King recognized that such "proposals all
stood for 'the kind of patriotism which means profits to private citizens'
which in turn meant a potential for scandal."33 In the end, Prime Minis-
ter King acknowledged the desire for Canada to attract immigrants who
had the potential to better contribute to the Canadian economy and
endorsed the WCCA's proposal. In a manner that is reflective of the
Canadian government's treatment of the Program today, this endorsement
was conditioned by Prime Minister King with the statement that "the
government of Canada accepted no responsibility for [WCCA's] undertak-
ings. 34
In 1966, over forty years later, a federal White Paper was introduced
which stressed that the privilege of immigration should be bestowed upon
those immigrants who could compete in the economic marketplace. This
document essentially became the blueprint for the Business Immigration
Program which was introduced as part of the Immigration Act of 1976."5
The Immigration Act was the culmination of a full-scale review of
Canada's immigration policy at a time when Canadians were focused on
traditional concerns of their own needs as a vast country with a shortage
of manpower and a low birth rate, as well as international issues concern-
ing world political problems.36 As the basis of Canada's current immi-
RG76/132/30477/1.
32 King Papers, J.A. Robb to King, Oct. 25, 1923, MG26 Jl/93/78724.
33 Schultz, Leaven for the Lump, supra note 25, at 155.
3' Id. Although this Note will not emphasize such comparisons, it is striking how
many parallels can be drawn between the immigration concerns recognized in Prime
Minister King's day and Canada's difficulties with its Immigrant Investor Program
today, over 70 years later.
31 JoHN DERMONT & THOMAS FENNELL, HONG KONG MONEY 92 (1989).
3' Gerald Segal, Canada, Britain and the Hong Kong Problem, 319 ROUND TABLE
285, 289 (July 1991). See also FREDA HAWKiNS, CRrriCAL YEARS IN IMMIGRATION, 53-
75 (1989).
Immigration boils down to a very simple formula. It's push-pull. Certain countries push
366 [Vol. 27:359
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gration policy, the Immigration Act today is a testament to Canada's
commitment to ending discrimination among immigrants on the basis of
race, national or ethnic origin, and religion through the codification of a
non-discriminatory point system core.37 The changes in legislation and
the point system also show Canada's commitment to attracting the "right
kind of people for a developing economy next door to the USA."3 For
example, under the Business Immigration Program, entrepreneurs were
given fourth priority among immigrant categories (after relatives, refugees,
and selected workers). Entrepreneurs still had to qualify under the point
system, but they were assessed mainly on their business skills.39
Many changes have been made to the Immigration Act throughout
the 1980s. Canada's immigration policy was revised in 1984 because of
the economic recession of the early 1980s. These amendments gave
entrepreneurs third priority (behind the family and refugee classes);
provided the entrepreneur with two years to produce a business proposal;
and required that the business need create only one new job, instead of
the previously required five new jobs.' In 1985, it became the stated
government policy to increase immigration levels in a moderate and con-
trolled manner in order to reverse a record low of people immigrating to
Canada.4 After heavy lobbying by banks and other financial institutions,
people out to Canada. All my clients tell me if it wasn't for [Hong Kong's reversion
to China in] 1997, they would maybe visit here once in their lifetime. And there's a
pull factor. There's an attractiveness to Canada - the school system, the safety. These
work in a kind of balance with one another.
Howard Greenberg (then Chair of the Canadian Bar Association (Ontario)) before the
Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and
Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 15 (9 June 1992) at
15:10 [hereinafter House of Commons, Issue No. 15].
" The point system was introduced in 1967 whereby the various classes of im-
migrants are considered according to the number of units of assessment received for
each of several criteria, including education, vocational preparation, experience, occupa-
tional demand in Canada, age, existence of pre-arranged employment, knowledge of
English or French, personal suitability, and the presence of relatives in Canada. GREY,
supra note 26, at 30.
"' Segal, supra note 36, at 289. See also HASHEMI, supra note 26, at 7-8, 11-12
(asserting that although very real gains were made in ending racism in Canadian
immigration, some laws enacted under the Immigration Act continued to function
inherently, though not explicitly, in a fashion that places unnecessary barriers in front
of visible minorities seeking to gain entrance).
" Whereas other immigrants are required to receive 50 units of assessment to be
successful, an entrepreneur needs to receive only 25 units. SOR/78-172, 1978, C. Gaz.
Part II, § 9 [am. SOR/79-851].
' R.S. 1985, C 1-2.
41 MARAGRET YOUNG, RESEARCH BRANCH OF THE LIBRARY OF PARLUAMENT,
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the investor category was introduced to the Business Immigration Program
in 1986.42 Thus, since 1986, business immigrants are allowed to apply
for entry under either the immigrant entrepreneur, the self-employed im-
migrant, or the immigrant investor categories.43 The Immigration Act was
again amended in 1993 by Bill C-86" in order to streamline the refugee
determination system, put in place better management tools for processing
immigrants abroad, and provide for better enforcement and control of the
Business Immigration Program.45
This brief history of Canada's immigration policy should make it
understood how the Program is a logical extension of Canada's continued
immigration policy preference of selective admissibility based upon
economic criteria.
IV. PROGRAM DESIGN
Employment and Immigration Canada enacted the Immigrant Investor
Program in January 1986 as "a means of admitting qualified business
persons to Canada who will invest their capital in Canadian business
ventures which will contribute to business expansion."' In particular, the
program was designed to create jobs and encourage investment in smaller
businesses which ordinarily have more trouble raising funds.47 Practitio-
ners are guided by the federal Guidelines for the Immigrant Investor
Program and must abide by the requirements set out in the Immigration
BACKGROUND PAPER NO. BP-190E, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM 1 (Jan. 1989,
rev. Sept. 1991) [hereinafter YOUNG, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM]. This
downward trend is shown in immigration levels ranging from a record high of 222,876
in 1967 to a low of 84,302 in 1985. Id. at app. 1.
42 SOR/89-585, 1989, C. Gaz. Part II, at 4939.
43 Id.
4 The legislative amendments contained in Bill C-86, An Act to Amend the Im-
migration Act and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof became chapter 49 of the Stat-
utes of Canada 1992.
4- IMMIGRATION CANADA, Cat. No. MP23-65/1993 rev, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION
LAW 2 (1993).
46 IMMIGRATION CANADA, IM-103-03-93, GUIDELINES FOR THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR
PROGRAM 1 (1993) [hereinafter PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993]. Employment and Immigra-
tion Canada has since been restructured and renamed Citizenship and Immigration
Canada.
' Id. For a small business, banks are unable to spend the money necessary to
perform due diligence. This makes an investment in a small business much more of a
risk than a multi-million dollar loan, making banks less likely to loan money. Question-
naire completed by Cecil L. Rotenberg, barrister & solicitor certified by Law Society
of Upper Canada as a "Specialist" in Immigration Law, Toronto (Mar. 24, 1994) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Rotenberg Questionnaire].
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Act, the Regulations to the Immigration Act, provincial securities legisla-
tion, as well as all regulations and financial and securities legislation in
any jurisdiction in which marketing efforts take place."
Qualification as an "investor" requires meeting a number of specific
parameters. In particular, the immigrant must have successfully operated,
controlled, or directed a business or commercial venture and the immi-
grant must have a minimum net worth of $500,000' which has been
accumulated through the immigrant's own endeavor." Given the impor-
tance placed on the investor category in the Business Immigration Pro-
gram, visa officers are expected to exercise a great amount of latitude in
their admission of investors. 1 In evaluating an immigrant's application,
visa officers consider the individual's background and experience and
decide whether this is the type of person envisaged under the Program:
"a person who has, through his previous or current activities, gained
significant business experience and who, given an opportunity, would be
likely to make a positive contribution to Canada on the basis of the
applicant's knowledge and skills."52 This category is not limited to
owners, presidents, and vice presidents, but is extended to persons who
have held other positions of significant responsibility.53 An immigrant
visa will be issued to a qualified investor only after verification that the
full amount of the minimum investment has been invested into an accept-
ed business. 4
The amount of money that the approved immigrant must invest in
4 PROGRAM GuIDELINES 1993, supra note 46.
49 A minimum of $700,000 is required if subject to a guarantee as a Tier III in-
vestment. Id. at 14. Net worth equals the immigrant's total assets less total liabilities.
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, IMMIGRATION MANUAL, in PAC. RIM
INvEsTMENT & Bus. IMMIGR., supra note 2, at 1.1.03.
-o An "investor" means an immigrant who: (a) has successfully operated, controlled or
directed a business or commercial undertaking, (b) has made a minimum investment,
since applying for an immigrant visa, that will contribute to the creation or continuation
of employment opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents, other than the
immigrant and the immigrant's dependents, and (c) has a net worth, accumulated by the
immigrant's own endeavors of at least $500,000 for a Tier I or Tier II investment or
$700,000 for a Tier IM investment.
PROGRAM GUIDEIJNES 1993, supra note 46, at 14.
5, EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, IMMIGRATION MANUAL, in PAC. RIM
INVESTMENT & Bus. IMMIGR., supra note 2, at 1.1.13.
2 Id. at 1.1.12. See also Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Labour, Employment and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No.
19 (16 June 1992) at 19:6-8.
" Cheng v. Canada (Secretary of State) 50 A.C.W.S. 3d 120 (1994).
4 PROGRAM GuiDELmES 1993, supra note 46, at 3.
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Canada depends upon the province into which the money will be invest-
ed. A three-tiered investment structure has been in effect since 1988,
which in theory ensures that economic benefits flow to all provinces."
Tier I provinces are permitted to offer investor immigration for a mini-
mum investment of $250,000, versus $350,000 in Tier II provinces."' A
province will be placed in Tier I if that province is the destination of less
than ten percent of business immigrants. 7 Tier II provinces are those
that receive more than ten percent annually of those immigrants entering
through the Business Immigration Program, and is generally comprised
only of the provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. 8 No
federal, provincial, or municipal investment incentives may be utilized to
change the minimum investment amount required in a particular Tier. 9
Tier III investments can be obtained in any province and was created for
investments of $500,000 for which the immigrant receives a guarantee.'
In order to ensure that there is an element of risk involved, no guaran-
tees, whether of interest payments or principal payment, are permitted in
Tier I or Tier II investments,6 with the limited exception being invest-
ments in Quebec.62
5- SOR/89-585, 1989, C. Gaz. Part II, 4939.
SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3411-13. Originally a minimum
investment of $150,000 was available. See supra note 6.
" Specifically, a province will be considered part of Tier I if it was:
the destination indicated on the immigrant visas of less than 10 percent of the aggregate
of those persons who were granted landing as entrepreneurs, investors and self-employed
persons in the calendar year prior to April 1 preceding the day on which the Minister
approved the eligible business or fund.
Id.
5 Fairey, supra note 14, at 1.3.21-22.
5 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 9.
o Tier III investments are typically implemented as follows:
A business with an existing operating line or loan of $500,000 or more from a
Canadian chartered bank, trust company or caisse is located; the "bank" funds are
replaced by the $500,000 Investor funds; the "bank," already satisfied with the credit-
worthiness of the borrower, is therefore prepared to guarantee the Investor's funds
absolutely and maintain the same security from the borrower which it had originally.
Peter D. Fairey, Some Realities of the Investor Programme, in PAC. RIM INVESTMENT
& Bus. IMMIGR. 3.2.01 (Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia,
1989).
61 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 7. Soon after the Program began,
controversy arose over the practice in some provinces of guaranteeing investments. The
federal government took the position that guarantees in either Tier I or Tier II
categories would undermine the entrepreneur program and would make it even more
difficult for the government to refute that Canadian visas were for sale. YOUNG,
CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note 41, at 16.
62 See generally Pearl Eliadis, Quebec's Investor Program: A Distinct Scheme, 9
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Investment Provinces Investor net Minimum Minimum
tier eligible worth investment holding
period








ll Available to all $700,000 $500,000 5 years
provinces
Guarantees are only acceptable in Tier I investments
63
There are two vehicles available in all tiers of the Program through which
an immigrant may invest in Canada: an approved business venture or
either a privately or government-administered venture capital fund. If the
investor chooses to invest in a specific business venture, simply purchas-
ing an approved business is not acceptable. The investment must be in an
active business operation, as defined by the Guidelines."
The immigrant may also invest in a federally approved investment
fund, which pools a number of immigrants' money and invests jointly in
federally approved projects. 5 An investment fund may take one of two
forms in order to be approved by the government. It may be a privately
_MM. L.R.(2d) 197, Case No. 93b (1990). See infra Section VII.
PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 6.
The investor's capital must be invested in the active business operations of a
business. Artificial transactions are prohibited. Two examples of what the federal
government may consider artificial transactions are: (1) a series of transactions whose
primary purpose serves to defeat the active business requirements by merely effecting
a refinancing, e.g., the purchase of a piece of existing machinery from a parent by a
subsidiary would not be a qualifying expenditure, but merely a refinancing; (2) a
change in corporate structure which primarily was enacted to defeat the eligible
business' size restriction, e.g., the creation of a corporation whose common shares are
held by a director of a parent company, to undertake a project which would normally
proceed via the parent itself. Id. at 5.
SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part I1, 3410, 3416.
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administered venture capital fund or a government-administered venture
capital fund.' The only difference between the two is that one is operat-
ed by the private sector whereas the other is operated directly by the
provincial government.67 Both types of funds must then use the pooled
money to invest in the active business operations of two or more eligible
businesses.
One of the benefits of investing in an approved business is that: (1)
the investor knows specifically where the money is being invested; and
(2) what type of industry is involved. For the alternative, fund managers
advocate that the benefits of investing in a fund, as opposed to a busi-
ness, are that it provides: (1) the opportunity to participate in a diversi-
fied portfolio of investments in small and medium-sized businesses; (2) a
reduced amount of risk than if the entire investment amount was placed
in one business; (3) returns that are competitive with those of other
investment options; and (4) a portfolio that is managed by a group of
investment managers."
While several provincial governments have placed restrictions on
investments into certain industries, 9 the federal government has also
enacted nationwide investment restrictions.7 ° Before an eligible fund or
business will be approved, the fund or business manager must submit an
offering memorandum and an escrow agreement to the Minister of Citi-
zenship and Immigration (Minister). An offering memorandum is a disclo-
sure document that describes the approved business and how the manag-
ers will use the investment money. The offering memorandum must use
statements that contain "full, true and plain disclosure of all material
6 Id. at 3410.
67 Id. at 3444. From the Program's start through 1993, only two provinces (Sas-
katchewan and Prince Edward Island) have chosen to operate a government-administered
venture capital fund, which shows that the vast majority of funds are privately
operated. CrrIZENSHiP AND IMMIGRATION, Busness IMMIGRATION BRANCH, PROGRAM
STATISTICS 1993, at schedule V (Apr. 1, 1994) [hereinafter PROGRAM STATISTICS 1993].
6 Deloitte & Touche, Report on the Canadian Maple Leaf Fund (Manitoba) Ltd.,
IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAM REVIEw, Apr. 14, 1993, at 6-7 (hereinafter Deloitte &
Touche, CMLF).
" Manitoba, for example, does not permit immigrant investments in natural resource
exploration operations. MANITOBA INVESTMENT PROMOTION BRANCH, IMMIGRANT
INVESTOR PROGRAM, MANITOBA PROGRAM GUIDELINES, in PAC. RIM INVESTMENT &
Bus. IMMIGR. 3.2.70 (Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 1989).
See also House of Commons, Issue No. 17, supra note 11 at 17:70 (listing criteria for
investment in Ontario).
70 Most notably, the 1993 amendments include rules to limit real estate-based
investments. SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3449. Further explanation and
analysis of real estate restrictions are discussed infra Section VI.
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facts" relating to the eligible business or fund." This uniform disclosure
is required to ensure that sufficient information is provided about the
investments.
Immigrants have full discretion in choosing which means best suit
their investment needs. Although investors can make investigatory visits
to Canada, most rely on information that is made available in their native
country. The federal government issues an official list of investment
operations participating in the Program, but the government adheres to a
disclaimer that "acceptance under the Program does not mean that any
government or securities commission in Canada has assessed or passed on
the merits, feasibility, financing, investment potential, commercial viabili-
ty, or risks associated with the offering."
The federal government only requires that the eligible business or
fund be managed or controlled by Canadian residents, and that certain
minimum and maximum offering levels are met 3 Each approved busi-
ness or fund has a limited amount of time in which to sell securities to
investors and meet its offering levels. This offering period is a maximum
of eighteen months, with the possibility of two six-month extensions74
During this time, the immigrant will choose an approved business or fund
by initially looking at the list distributed by the federal government. After
an eligible business or fund is contacted, the prospective investor must re-
ceive a copy of the offering memorandum before the investor agrees to
make the minimum investment. This allows the investor to have access to
the same data that was available to the government and make an in-
formed decision about the investment proposal. It also allows the immi-
grant to be fully aware of his legal rights, since each offering memoran-
dum must contain a statement of the investors' contractual and statutory
rights of the province in question. 5 In addition to reviewing the offering
memorandum, the immigrant would review the approved business or
fund's promotional material and would take into account the province
where the investment is located, the reputation of the business or fund,
the advice of independent financial and legal consultants, and the business
or fund's sales and marketing agents who promote the opportunities
abroad.76
"' PROGRAM GutLnES 1993, supra note 46, at 8.
7 Id. at 11.
73 SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3447. See PROGRAM GuiDELimEs 1993,
supra note 46, at 4 (explaining the regulations concerning the size of an offering).
74 SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3448.
7 PROGRAM GUIDELINEs 1993, supra note 46, at 9.
76 Tyrus Reiman, Legal Update: Immigration Law, CANADIAN LAW., Aug.-Sept.
1992, at 53.
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After an investor chooses the approved business or fund the immi-
grant must invest the minimum investment for a five-year minimum
holding period. This minimum holding period begins on the date that one
hundred percent of the immigrant's investment is invested in the active
business operations of an eligible business.' This time requirement was
implemented to ensure that the investor's money is truly invested, that is,
irrevocably committed to the project, not just being held by the fund
while other immigrants are being solicited.78 To this end, all minimum
investments must be held by an escrow agent until the minimum offering
is met and the investment is ready to be made into a business opera-
tion.7 ' This procedure creates an audit trail which is useful in the moni-
toring of approved businesses and funds.
If the investor's application for business immigration is rejected (for
medical or security reasons, for example), the approved business or fund
must return the investor's money within ninety days of notice of such
rejection." Also, if the approved business or fund's minimum offering
is not met by the end of the offering period, all investors' money must
be returned or transferred to another approved business or fund (at the
investor's discretion) within thirty days.8'
Prior to the 1993 regulatory changes, only limited provisions were
outlined in the federal Guidelines that would take effect when the investor
Guidelines were breached or knowingly contravened. Primarily, the only
action available was the business or fund's suspension from the Program.
Under the pre-1993 Program Guidelines, the federal government would
reconsider its approval given to the suspect investment proposal and to
any other projects which the original business or fund's owners, promot-
ers, or associates were involved. 2 During this investigative period, the
government's approval of the business or fund in question could have
been suspended." If suspension occurred during the time when the fund
'n PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 7.
78 Regulation 9(3) states that any investment may have a condition that it be refunded
if the immigrant is not granted an immigrant visa. This is the only condition that does
not negate the irrevocable aspect of the investment commitment. Any other provision for
a refund would render the investment commitment revocable [and the investment would
be in violation of the Program requirements].
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, IMMIGRATION MANUAL, in PAC. RIM
INVESTMENT & Bus. IMMIGR., supra note 2, at 1.1.14.
79 PROGRAM GUIDELNES 1993, supra note 46, at 7-8.
'0 SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part 11, 3410, 3423.
" PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 10.
82 IMMIGRATION CANADA, GUIDELINES FOR THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAM 9
(1991).
8 The Minister could have suspended approval, for example, if the approved
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or business was still soliciting investors, no further marketing activity or
subscription could have been undertaken until the breach was resolved.84
If the government rescinded its acceptance of the investment propos-
al, all investment funds were to be returned to the investors who could
invest in another business or fund of their choice. Suspension could have
been lifted at the Minister's discretion if certain terms and conditions
were met by the suspended fund or business. Independent of the
government's decision regarding withdrawal of project acceptance, inves-
tors had rights of rescission pertaining to "material misrepresentation or
non-disclosure of a material fact."' 5 Investors who wished to exercise
this right of withdrawal or rescission needed to notify the government in
writing to arrange for a transfer of their investment money to another
approved business or fund.
Recent improprieties, particularly in Manitoba, have lead to much
needed governmental attention being focused on these inadequate enforce-
ment and monitoring provisions.
V. MISMANAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN MANITOBA
On August 18, 1992, the province of Manitoba hired the accounting
firm of Deloitte & Touche to perform an audit review of the Program as
it was operating in Manitoba.86 This full program audit's objective was
conducting a comprehensive review of investment offerings to determine
the level of compliance and the amount of economic benefit accruing in
the province." After an initial report issued on December 30, 1992,"
Manitoba's Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism requested addi-
tional in-depth reviews of five syndicated funds and business venture
projects 9 and on January 4, 1993, placed a moratorium on provincial
business or fund did not comply with the terms and conditions of its acceptance, if the
Minister had reason to believe that certain Immigration Act offenses had been commit-
ted, or if a province suspended its approval of an eligible business or fund. SOR/93-
412, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3450-51.
84 IMMIGRATION CANANDA, supra note 82 at 9.
5 Id. at 8.
' Deloitte & Touche, Summary Report on Audit Reviews, IMMIGR. INVESTOR PROG.
REV., May 19, 1993, at index [hereinafter Deloitte & Touche, Summary Report].
87 Deloitte & Touche, Summary Report and Recommendations, IMMIGR. INVESTOR
PROG. REV., Dec. 30, 1992, at 1.
SId.
The audit was performed by Deloitte & Touche regarding: (1) The Winnipeg
Ramada Renaissance Hotel Limited Partnership; (2) The Bison Fund of Manitoba, Ltd.;
(3) The Canadian Maple Leaf Fund (Manitoba) Ltd.; (4) Winnlnvest Capital Corpora-
tion, WinnPacific Capital Corporation, & WinnFuture Capital Corporation; and (5) Hotel
1995]
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acceptance and processing of any offerings under the Program.
Manitoba's Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism Minister Eric
Stefanson announced that this action was in response to the auditor's
report which called for "clearer definition of the roles and responsibilities
of the federal and provincial governments with respect to the review,
compliance, and monitoring of the program." The problems identified
in these projects include: related party transactions, embezzlement, misrep-
resentation of material information, and non-compliance with foreign
securities laws."' These problems are worth studying as they are repre-
sentative of the types of situations which occur across Canada and which
new immigration regulations aim at correcting.' Improprieties in Manito-
ba are emphasized because more empirical data is available on projects in
that province, due to the Deloitte & Touche Program audit, than on
similar cases of mismanagement in other locations.
A. Related Party Transactions
The audit uncovered a significant number of problems concerning
related party transactions.93 In particular, the auditors found that a signif-
Executive Centre (International I) Limited Partnership, Hotel Executive Centre (Interna-
tional 11) Limited Partnership, & Lakeview Airport Executive Centre Phase IT. Deloitte
& Touche, Summary Report, supra note 86, at index.
' Glen Cheater, Manitoba Opts Out of Program: Immigrant Investor Plan Decried,
FIN. POST, Jan. 5, 1993, at 14.
9, See generally Deloitte & Touche, Summary Report, supra note 86.
92 One federal audit of the Program's operation during 1986-1989 found that nearly
one-third of the investors had personal knowledge of abuse associated with their funds;
more than two-thirds had heard of such problems; and less than half were pleased with
how their money was managed. Audit by Ernst & Young (Nov. 1992) cited in Kirk
LaPointe, Federal Auditor Finds Start-up Flaws in Immigrant Investor Program,
GAZETTE (MONTREAL), Dec. 20, 1993, at A9.
9 Deloitte & Touche, Final Summary Report, supra note 86, at 8-10, 15. Such
accusations were made against Canadian Maple Leaf Financial Corporation of Van-
couver (CMLF), a specialist corporate finance company and the largest of Canada's
immigrant investor fund managers. Listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, there are
currently divisions of CMLF in several provinces, including Canadian Maple Leaf Fund
(Manitoba) Ltd. which was the focus of this audit's investigation. CMLF received pro-
vincial approval on August 30, 1988, and attained federal acceptance on November 18,
1988. It subsequently received subscriptions from a total of 232 investors each
contributing $150,000 each, totaling $34,800,000. Because twenty-one immigrants failed
the visa application, the total amount of investment money available for investment was
$31,650,000. Provisions were made for the issuance of retractable preferred shares, com-
mon shares, or junior preferred shares of CMLF stock to investors. Deloitte & Touche,
CMLF, supra note 68, at 2-6.
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icant number of investments were made in companies in which fund
directors had a personal interest.94 As the report stated, "[rielated party
transactions put a great degree of responsibility on the board of directors
to ensure that they conduct proper due diligence and evaluation to
adequately discharge their fiduciary responsibility as to the appropriateness
of the transaction." '95 Fund managers did not meet this level of scrutiny.
The auditors also discovered that short-term investment funds were not
invested in Canadian chartered banks as is required.96 Rather, the money
was placed in private investment companies whose shareholders included
the fund managers.'
B. Embezzlement
It was found that interest income earned on short-term deposits was
not regularly credited to the fund.98 On numerous other occasions, audi-
tors discovered that fund managers were diverting money from proper
investment avenues. 99 Some fund managers were also found to be receiv-
ing excessive management fees. In one case, the offering memorandum
provided for a management fee of two and one-half percent of the fund's
"net asset value," which is the fund's assets less its liabilities."° Audi-
tors found that management fees were actually paid based upon gross
subscriptions received, as opposed to net asset value. For one fund
manager, this resulted in an overpayment of $9,534 in just the first six
months of 1992."'
4 Deloitte & Touche, CMLF, supra note 68, at 25-29.
9 Id. at 31. In the case of CMLF, because three of the five directors are appointed
by the fund manager, there is a great potential for conflict of interest or perceived con-
flict of interest. Id. It was recommended that multi-million dollar funds that offer shares
to investors should be held to the same standard as widely held public corporations:
shareholders should elect board members without restrictions by the management and
the number of independent directors should be adequate in number to ensure the
interests of the shareholders are protected. Id. at 31-32.
" While 70% of investment funds must be invested in active business within nine
months of the investment being made (this is the so-called 70% Rule), 30% of the
Fund's residual investments may be maintained, instead, as short-term instruments issued
by Canadian chartered banks as liquid investments. PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra
note 46, at 6.
7 Deloitte & Touche, Report on Audit Review of the Bison Fund of Manitoba, Ltd.,
IMMIG. INVESTOR PROG. REV., Mar. 17, 1993, at 18-19 [hereinafter Deloitte & Touche,
Bison Fund].
9 Id. at 19.
99 Id.
'o Id. at 20.
... See id. at 20-21. One fund in Saskatchewan refurbished a landmark hotel with
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Auditors also uncovered discrepancies as to the cost of certain
projects. Most notably, such problems were linked to the Winnipeg
Ramada Renaissance Hotel Limited Partnership, which was marketed as
a specific business venture for a proposed hotel development."° Al-
though the offering memorandum listed the cost of hotel completion as
$21,930,000, the official architect indicated the budget to be only
$13,142,000. The business managers explained that the difference of
$8,788,000 was for "overhead costs" that would be incurred during the
three-year period it would take to complete the project. 03 No definition
of "overhead costs" was ever provided per the auditors' request, which
led them to conclude that the business did not comply with the terms of
its offering memorandum.' 4 In addition to these violations, the auditors
also uncovered cash deficiencies, non-compliance with material contracts,
and the co-mingling of funds from the limited partnership with those
from the investors' escrow account. 5
C. Misrepresentation of Material Information
Auditors found that a number of Manitoba's funds were under the
undisclosed control of one entity, Lakeview Group of Companies
(Lakeview), which created concern regarding possible breach of fiduciary
duty towards investors." 6 Fund managers explained that Lakeview and
investment money. The fund managers collected $2.3 million in management fees,
which were duly disclosed in the fund's offering memorandum. What was not disclosed
was that fund managers also received $2.4 million directly from the hotel in manage-
ment and "finders fees" presumably for securing investors for the project. Baines, supra
note 14, at 32.
"o This was one of a number of immigrant investment opportunities set up to
benefit the Lakeview Group of Companies (Lakeview). This project's promoter was
Lakeview through its subsidiary, C. H. Inns & Suites Inc. During the business' market-
ing period that ended September 30, 1992, 120 immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and Korea each invested $150,000 for a total of $18 million in the project. Deloitte &
Touche, Report on Audit Review of the Winnipeg Ramada Renaissance Hotel Limited
Partnership, IMMIGR. INVESTOR PRno. REV., Feb. 4, 1993, at 2-3, 7, 11 [hereinafter
Deloitte & Touche, Ramada L.P.]. See supra note 6 for information about changes in
minimum investment requirements.
103 Id. at 13.
104 Id.
'o5 Id. at 9, 17, 24.
" Lakeview maintained indirect control over the Bison Fund of Manitoba, Ltd.,
which is a private syndicate fund that was marketed as "a pool of capital raised to
facilitate investment by overseas investors in businesses located in Manitoba and to
facilitate the meaning of certain of the criteria by the investor required to obtain a
Canadian immigrant visa." The Fund received a total of 81 subscribers (16 of which
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its marketing organization helped enable other funds to obtain the number
of subscribers needed to meet the minimum offering level. The problem
with this, however, was that an agreement was made without the knowl-
edge of the investors which enabled Lakeview projects to have the first
option to use investment funds raised. 7 This caused investment projects
to fraudulently differ from the stated objectives in the offering memoran-
dum and marketing information.'
In one case, the offering memorandum clearly stated that the focus
of investments would be on manufacturing or processing and technical
research and development." But, in reality, eleven percent consisted of
investments in new company financing, while eighty-nine percent of
investments were placed in real estate projects."0 Additionally, market-
ing information indicated that the proposed portfolio makeup would
consist of "73% of Available Funds in Government Secured Investments
& Mortgage-Backed Investments" and "27% in Equity Ownership of
Quality Real Estate" which falsely suggests that a large portion of the
portfolio would be invested in highly secured investments."' This mar-
keting information also identified certain hotel projects"' as potential
investments which were already approved for another immigrant fund, and
therefore would not be available for investment by that particular
fund."' These misrepresentations of material information clearly circum-
vented Program Guidelines." 4
were not fully paid due to foreign securities regulations) who invested $150,000 each,
with fully paid capital available for investment of $9,750,000. Deloitte & Touche, Bison
Fund, supra note 97, at 2.
'o See id. at 15.
"0 Other problems related to relationships between the Bison Fund and Lakeview
were a lack of legal documentation and registration for Lakeview investments and the
fund manager's failure to act separately from Lakeview. Loans were given at below
market rates. No due diligence was performed on Lakeview projects and no follow-up
or monitoring was performed regarding utilization of funds given to Lakeview projects.
Id. at 16-18.
o9 Id. at 3.
"0 Id. at 15.
11 Id. at 20.
... One project listed was the aforementioned Ramada Renaissance Hotel. Id.
113 Id.
114 PROGRAm GumLns 1993, supra note 46, at 8.
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D. Non-Compliance with Applicable Foreign Securities Laws
The auditors also found that certain immigrant-funded businesses
were not in compliance with applicable foreign securities laws."5 Feder-
al statistics show that during 1992, as in previous and subsequent years,
the top three sources for business immigrants were Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and South Korea." 6 While applicable security regulations vary depend-
ing on the country involved, fund managers are responsible for abiding by
the security regulations of the countries in which they market the pro-
ject.' 17
In Taiwan, as long as the offering is marketed privately, no securities
approvals are required. "However, the funds must come from outside
Taiwan, otherwise the offering may be in contravention of monetary
exchange regulations, the consequences of which are severe."" 8 In other
countries, such as South Korea, domestic regulations do not allow transfer
of the investor's money until a visa is issued."9 This is problematic,
because as previously noted, visas for an immigrant investor will not be
issued until the minimum investment has been irrevocably committed to
an approved project. 2°
15 These problems were associated with Lakeview's Winnipeg Ramada Renaissance
Hotel Limited Partnership. Deloitte & Touche, Ramada L.P., supra note 102, at 2-4.
116 PROGRAM STATISTICS 1993, supra note 67, at schedule II. Hong Kong and Tai-
wan, the top two sources, accounted for 83.5% of immigrant investors. Id.
17 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 1.
.. Deloitte & Touche, Ramada L.P., supra note 102, at 16. See generally John D.
Weston, Republic of China Legal Considerations Governing Outward Investment by
Taiwan Investors, in PAC. RIM INVESTMENT & Bus. IMMIGR. 7.2 (Continuing Legal
Education Society of British Columbia, 1989).
..9 Deloitte & Touche, Ramada L.P., supra note 102, at 16. In practice, after a
potential Korean immigrant investor has met all applicable security, medical, and
selection criteria, the Canadian Embassy in Seoul issues a letter stating same. The
applicant then takes this letter to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at which time
permission is granted for the applicant to exchange Korean won for Canadian dollars
for the amount of the investment. After the investment has been made, the Canadian
Embassy issues the visa. Letter from David L. Thomas, The David L. Thomas Law
Corporation, Vancouver, B.C., a firm specializing in immigration law, to James DeRosa
(Mar. 1, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from David L. Thomas].
120 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 3. See infra note 54. In Quebec,
there is the possibility of an investor pledging an investment to a bank and immediate-
ly borrowing up to 80% of the amount of his investment. In effect, the client may
have access to the 80% by paying the difference between the investment return and the
bank's interest charges. This method is particularly appealing to South Koreans because
of their domestic restrictions. Questionnaire completed by David L. Thomas (Mar. 21,
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Hong Kong has enacted the most stringent regulations affecting the
marketing of foreign securities. Pursuant to the Code on Immigration-
Linked Investment Schemes Intended to be Advertised or Offered to the
Public,'2' enacted in March 1990, any offering that is marketed in Hong
Kong must be approved by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures
Commission (SFC).' 2 This Code sets out and explains the policy and
criteria which is applied by the SFC for the authorization of "documenta-
tion which advertises or offers to the public immigration-linked invest-
ment schemes."'" In addition to full disclosure of all material facts,'24
the auditors noted that the SFC also requires that 91.3753 percent of all
Hong Kong immigrant investors' funds be held in trust under the control
of a trustee pending construction of the project."n This money can only
be withdrawn from the account by the promoter "as costs are incurred on
the project and such withdrawals are subject to certification by the project
architect as to the percentage of completion of the project."'26 These
Hong Kong regulations were clearly violated by certain fund manag-
ers.127
1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thomas Questionnaire].
The appeal of Quebec's loan-back practice is that generally Korean business
emigrants are limited to exchanging only $500,000 (U.S.) of their funds for emigration
purposes. It has been indicated, however, that the Korean government is taking steps
to either raise or eliminate this limit. Letter from David L. Thomas, supra note 119.
121 SEcuRrrms & FuTuREs CoMMISSION, Code on Immigration-Linked Investment
Schemes Intended to be Advertised or Offered to the Public (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter
SFC Code] (this code was enacted pursuant to section 4(2)(g) of the Protection of
Investors Ordinance).
122 Id. at i.
123 Id. at i.
,24 The SFC scrutinizes the details of a fund's marketing information to ensure
adequate disclosure of relevant information in the scheme's documentation. It does not
address, nor could it address, the quality or merits of the schemes from an investment
point of view. If the fund is small enough, the SFC will not investigate it. After the
initial approval, there is no monitoring of the fund or the fund's compliance with Hong
Kong's securities laws. See id. at 12. See also Telephone Interview with Eric Wai,
partner in the law firm Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosl6, Hong Kong (Feb. 28,
1993) [hereinafter Wai Interview]; Securities & Futures Commission, Press Release:
SFC Warning on Immigration-Linked Investment Schemes, in PAC. RIM INVESTMENT &
Bus. IMMIGR. 3.1.09 (Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 1989)
[hereinafter SFC, Press Release].
"2 Deloitte & Touche, Ramada L.P., supra note 102, at 4.
126 Id.
27 In light of this regulation, the Lakeview business promoter was obligated to
transfer $9,594,406 (91.3753% of Hong Kong investor's money) into a "Payment and
Administration Account" under the control of a trustee. However, only $7,440,790 was
19951
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Such foreign security regulations were enacted upon the realization
that the primary objective of investors is not investment, but emigration
from their home countries and that the primary objective of the promoters
and managers is to raise capital for investment, not the ultimate immigra-
tion by investors. This reality, coupled with each country's lack of
extraterritorial application of its security laws and a nearly unchecked
opportunity for personal monetary gain, lead to such abuses in the
Immigrant Investor Program.
E. Summary
Deloitte & Touche concluded that the Program Guidelines "do not
clearly define the promoters' and developers' obligation to disclose (to
investors) all financial benefits accruing to them, including recoveries of
expenses and overhead costs, and transactions with the fees earned by
related parties."'28 Additionally, the auditors stated that "[tihe investor
has no assurance that the project costs incurred were reasonable and in
accordance with the offering memorandum. There is no final accounting
required as to the promoter's fees, expense and overhead recoveries,
profits, and transactions with related parties." 29
As a result of these findings, the province of Manitoba announced in
late May 1993, that it would completely withdraw from the Program until
sufficient program reforms were enacted. 3' This withdrawal came after
Bill C-86 introduced one set of regulatory changes in February 1993.
Additional amendments were expected in August 1993. While Bill C-86
provided the authority to better regulate the Program, including the
creation of enforceable offenses and penalties specific to the Program, the
Manitoba government recognized that further changes were needed for the
Program to be successful.
VI. BILL C-86
The most conspicuous problem with the Program was the failure of
legislators to give the Investor category a statutory base. As it will be




maintained in the account making the business in violation of the Hong Kong securities
regulations. Id. at 11.
128 H.K. Investors in Canada Stand to Lose Millions, Bus. TIMEs (SINGAPORE), Jan.
12, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, txtfe File.
129 Id.
"3 John Gold, Canada: Immigration Door Closes in Canada, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 30, 1993, at 2.
13 See generally C. L. Rotenberg, Where is the Legislative Base for the Investor
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Only a visa officer has the ability to grant a visa and only a port
officer can grant landing.' Applicable case law shows that these deci-
sions cannot be delegated to another party.133 Admission decisions by
these officers must be based upon considerations enumerated under
Section 114(l)(a) of the Immigration Act, such as personal attributes and
attainments, demographics, and labor market considerations.'34
The Investor category, however, was established such that entry was
based primarily on the foreigner placing money in a business or fund
fostering the development of "significant economic benefit.""13 To afford
government supervision, provinces have been the authorities which have
approved funds in accordance with their economic priorities.'36 A prob-
lem arose, therefore, because an investment in a fund having certain
characteristics does not come within the personal attainment category a
visa officer must review under Section 114(1)(a) of the Immigration Act.
Thus, because this determination which by law must be made by the visa
officer was actually being made by provincial authorities, it can be seen
that virtually everything about the Investor category was therefore ultra
vires.137
In addition, because the Program was governed merely by official
Guidelines instead of enforceable regulations, no additional obligations
could be placed upon fund managers, operators, or promoters to provide
specific business information to immigration authorities. 3 ' There could
Category? 9 IMM. L.R. (2d) 85, Case No. 81m.
2 See Immigration Act, S.C., ch. 52, §§ 6, 9, 1976-1977 (1976) (Can.).
' Muliadi and Queen's Photo Finishing, Ltd. v. The Minister of Employment and
Immigration, Federal Court of Appeals, A-260-85 (1986) (standing for a number of
principles, but primarily that visa officials cannot delegate decisions to third parties).
" Section 115 of the Immigration Act states
The Governor in Council may make regulations (a) providing for the establishment and
application of selection standards based on such factors as family relationships, educa-
tion, language, skill, occupational experience and other personal attributes and attain-
ments, together with demographic considerations and labor market conditions in Canada,
for the purpose of determining whether or not an immigrant will be able to become
successfully established in Canada ....
Immigration Act, S.C., ch. 52, 1976-1977 (1976) (Can.).
'3' Regulation 9(1)(b)(iii)(B) states that investments may be made ...
(B) in a privately administered investment syndicate acceptable to the province in which
the syndicate makes or will make investments, the main purpose of which syndicate is
to provide equity or loan capital to establish, purchase, expand or maintain business or
commercial ventures that will be of significant economic benefit to that province....
(emphasis added).
t3 Provinces were of the opinion that the phrase "significant economic benefit" gave
them this right. Rotenberg Questionnaire, supra note 47.
t Rotenberg Questionnaire, supra note 47. See also Rotenberg, supra note 131.
' Cecil Rotenberg & Mary Lain, Transitional Retrospectivity - Section 109 of Bill
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be found no authority for the federal government to become involved in
the approval of a fund or enter into any agreement to limit its activi-
ty.139 Greed overwhelmed the investor category in a manner that has
been suggested to be similar to the lack of morality created by the
Reagan deregulation years in U.S. banking practices; major misrepresen-
tations were made by fund managers, lawyers, consultants, and provincial
and municipal officials to fraudulently encourage immigrants to participate
in poor business ventures.'" Large commissions were earned on each
subscription and often the immigrant's money was never invested into a
legitimate business. 4'
Recognizing that "[a]buse of these programs undermines the public's
confidence in the value and effectiveness of these vital national pro-
grams," 42 the 1993 regulatory changes finally provided a statutory
framework for the Program and established monitoring and enforcement
regulations. All previous changes had made the Program less attractive to
investors, yet more beneficial to Canada. For example, in 1990, the
amount of time an immigrant needed to keep his money invested was
raised from three years to the current level of five, as well as raising the
minimum investment amount in certain provinces from $250,000 to
$350,000.
In tandem with Bill C-86, the first series of amendments came into
force on February 1, 1993,'" followed by a second set of amendments
that went into force on August 9, 1993.'" Bill C-86 introduced the
most substantial changes to Canada's immigration law since 1976 when
the federal Immigration Act was drafted. Notably, Section 114(1)(a) of the
Immigration Act was amended by section 102 of Bill C-86 (commonly
known as the Rotenberg Amendments) which provides explicit statutory
underpinnings for the Program. Bill C-86 also converted many of the
administrative guidelines contained in the federal Guidelines into readily
enforceable regulations, as well as outlined offenses and penalties specific
to the Program.4 These changes were the fruit of many months of
C-86 and the Immigrant Investor Program, 18 IMM. L.R. (2d) 227, 227-28, Case No.
183a (1993).
139 Id.
,4 Rotenberg Questionnaire, supra note 47.
'4' See, e.g., David Baines, Police Digging Into Prairie Immigrant Fund, VANCou-
VER SUN, June 11, 1994, at A14.
42 Government Proposes Changes to Immigration Program, Canada NewsWire, June
16, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, CNW File.
,4 SOR/93-44, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II.
'" SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II.
'4 Id. at 3443.
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intensive evaluation of the Program"' and were meant to provide the
rigorous regulatory framework needed to protect the integrity of the
Program in Canada and abroad. 47
Bill C-86 provides assurances of added transparency of the workings
of the approved businesses and funds and improves the protection of
Program participants. Approved businesses and funds must submit annual
audited financial statements to the Minister, as well as quarterly reports
containing particulars of use." Through Bill C-86, the federal govern-
ment has the authority to conduct an examination of a fund's business re-
cords "'49 purportedly to determine that,
Every person who operates, manages or promotes an approved business
or fund [ensures] that all records that relate to transactions involving the
business or fund are kept in Canada, including the original of all books,
papers, documents and correspondence and copies of all electronic data
and communications that relate to those transactions.' 5
As this is the only obligation placed on an operator, manager, or promot-
er of an approved business or fund in the Immigration Act, Bill C-86, or
the Regulations, it is worth noting that the powers of examination given
to the Minister are far beyond those necessary to ensure that the business
or fund is abiding by this one provision.' While it has been argued
'6 Id. at 3453-54.
'47 Id. at 3443.
" See id. at 3440-42 (fully outlining in Schedule X the exact contents required of
an approved business or fund quarterly report).
141 "The Minister may conduct an examination of any business or fund approved by
the Minister in order to ensure that it is being operated, managed and promoted in
accordance with this Act and the regulations." Section 102.001, enacted by § 88 of Bill
C-86. The Minister need not conduct an in-depth investigation into all business records,
and indeed there is no guidance as to what the Minister should be examining or in-
vestigating in the operation of the business or fund. Rotenberg & Lain, supra note 138,
at 236.
150 Section 102.003, enacted by § 88 of Bill C-86.
.5 Rotenberg & Lain, supra note 138, at 236.
In conducting an examination, the Minister may (a) inquire into the affairs of the busi-
ness or fund, or of any person who manages, operates or promotes it, and examine (i)
any books, papers, documents, correspondence, electronic data, communications, negotia-
tions, transactions, loans, borrowing or payments that relate to the business or fund, (ii)
any property or other assets that are at any time held or controlled by or on behalf of
the business or fund, (iii) any liabilities, debts, undertakings or obligations that exist,
and any financial or other conditions that prevail, at any time, in relation to the busi-
ness or fund, (iv) any relationship that exists at any time between the business or fund
and any person by reason of investments, commissions promised, secured or paid,
interest held or acquired, the lending or borrowing of money, stock or other property,
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that such regulations impose too harsh a burden on investor funds and
businesses,'52 the government apparently wanted to make a strong state-
ment that disregarding the spirit of the Program would no longer be
tolerated.
Managers of funds approved after January 31, 1993, who fail to
comply with the Immigration Act are subject to the possibility of prosecu-
tion.153 Maximum penalties of fimes of $500,000 and imprisonment for
five years may now be imposed for specific Program-related offenses.'54
Offenses include: "failure to comply with terms and conditions governing
approvals, submitting false information in relation to an application for
approval and making misleading representations about an approved
business or fund., 155 Approved businesses and funds must also afford
investors all civil remedies available under provincial securities legislation
for misrepresentation in an offering memorandum.' 56  As previously
noted, deceptive fund managers had little to fear before Bill C-86. In the
past, fund managers who directly or indirectly abused the program would
only lose the right to offer future investment opportunities under the Pro-
gram. 5 This past practice cannot be seen as a real penalty since dis-
honest fund managers already made their money; there was no threat of
the transfer, negotiations or holding of stock, interlocking directorates, common control,
undue influence or control or any other relationship; (b) required the business or fund,
or any person who operates, manages, promotes or audits it, to provide information and
explanations, to the extent that they are reasonably able to do so, in respect to the
business or fund or of any entity in which it has investment; (c) ... at any reasonable
time, enter and inspect any building, receptacle or place in which the Minister believes
on reasonable grounds there is any thing referred to in paragraph (a); and (d) seize any
thing that the Minister believes on reasonable grounds will afford evidence in respect
of the commission of an offence under this Act.
Section 102.001(2), enacted by § 88 of Bill C-86.
152 "The new investor Regulations constitute an attempt to lock the barn doors after
the horse has left. Indeed they are so strict that practical creation and marketing are
virtually impossible." Rotenberg Questionnaire, supra note 47.
"' SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3444.
154 Every person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable (a) on convic-
tion or indictment, (i) for a first offence, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand
dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both, or (ii) for
a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars or to im-
prisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or to both; or (b) on summary
conviction, (i) for a first offence, to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or (ii)
for a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.
Section 94.6(2), enacted by § 85 of Bill C-86.





The 1993 revisions also placed restrictions on passive real estate
investments. This was aimed at correcting the fact that by 1992, sixty-
nine percent of the money invested under the Program was real estate-
based."9 In the past, real estate was used to lure investors to a particu-
lar province. Some provinces would regularly approve real estate develop-
ment projects which assured security for the investor, yet provided little
or no economic benefit to the province."w Investment in real estate
generally has negligible economic benefit because it largely creates jobs
in construction and the low wage service sector which could be financed
through conventional sources.'61 Land speculation by foreign purchasers
also cause public disdain as housing prices rise and retailers and those
who rent office space suffer from rising commercial rents due to the
escalating price of office buildings.'62
To remedy these problems, Bill C-86 established that immigrant
investor projects may no longer develop, renovate, or own residential real
estate, or invest immigrant funds in commercial real estate property solely
for the purpose of deriving lease or rental income, or benefit from
increases in property value. Additionally, existing commercial real
estate property may only be purchased for use in the operation of a busi-
ness (not for lease or rental income), provided that not more than fifty
percent of the subscriptions are used for the purchase.' In practice, if
a project is developed to derive lease or rental income, all Program funds
must be used for improvements or construction (not the purchase of
land); in the case of the operation of an active business, no more than
fifty percent of the Program funds may be used for the purchase of
... Again, some practitioners argue that the new regulations come too late, saying
that those who have abused the system have already made their money and gotten out.
Yang questionnaire, supra note 15.
,s9 Susan Henders & Don Pittis, Hong Kong Capital Flows Into Canada, CANADA
& HONG KONG UPDATE, Summer 1993, at 1.
60 For example, one Tier I province approved an investment into an office building
which was substantially leased to the provincial government. This assured the investor
of a return on the investment, but provided negligible benefit to the province's
economy. Fairey, supra note 60, at 3.2.02.
161 Id.
362 RusSEL DEIGAN, INVESTING IN CANADA: THE PURSUiT AND REGULATION OF
FOREIGN INvESTMENTS, 411-12 (1991). See generally DONALD GUTSTEIN, THE NEW
LANDLORDS: ASIAN INVESTMENT IN CANADIAN REAL ESTATE (1990) (commenting on
the impact of foreign investment on real estate prices).
SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3424.
'64 Id. at 3449.
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existing land and buildings.'"5
While Bill C-86 transforms the previous Guidelines into enforceable
regulations and contains authorizing legislation for the Investor category,
such measures in and of themselves are inadequate to correct the type of
problems that have become commonplace in the Program.'" Though an
important step, these amendments should have been enacted many years
before, along with regulations that addressed several other problem areas.
Also, many offerings which have not yet repaid investors will continue to
have scandals because these new regulations do not apply retroactive-
ly.167
These amendments fail to protect investors from unscrupulous
profiteering in foreign jurisdictions and did not attempt to dispel the
common illusion of a government seal of approval on the business or
fund. Bill C-86 also does not correct abuses of policy inherent in the
Program. In particular, the new regulations do little to ensure long-term
benefits to Canada's economy or increased development of poorer prov-
inces. It also fails to address the overwhelming sense of bureaucratic
confusion that has arisen among the provinces and the federal government
with respect to the Program. In the following sections, this Note will
explore each of these remaining problem areas, concluding that such
regulatory changes need to be made before the Program is reinstated in
1996.
'65 PROGRAM GuIDELINEs 1993, supra note 46, at 11.
16 If the Government is really serious about the promotion of risk capital in relation to
immigration to Canada, let us have a regulation which sets forth the criteria in plain
and simple language. Let us have a wording which can neither obfuscate intent in
favour of slick marketing operators nor defeat the innocent who happen to have become
involved with the policy in an untimely or different way. Let us not leave commercially
vital and expensively prepared material to the whim of whoever it is who happens to
be in power at the, moment and to the vagaries of bureaucracy.
C. L. Rotenberg, The Investor Category - "A Legal Bouillabaisse" 6 IMMIGR. L.R.(2d)
179, Case No. 63d (1989).
,67 Section 109 of the Transitional Provisions of Bill C-86 cannot be interpreted as
applying to businesses or funds approved prior to January 31, 1993. See Rotenberg &
Lam, supra note 138, at 235. "I am of the opinion that unless the government is
proactive in its enforcement and auditing [of] the Immigrant Investor Fund, fraud will
be a norm." Questionnaire completed by Mendel M. Green, partner with Green and
Spiegel, Toronto (Mar. 25, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Green
Questionnaire].
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VII. CANADA'S UNEVEN REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Competition among the provinces to attract the best immigrants has
traditionally been facilitated by the status of Canada's immigration laws.
Immigration law is a field of administrative law which it uniquely
situated in Canada's federal system."' From as early as the Constitution
Act, 1867,169 immigration has been an area that is subject to concurrent
federal-provincial powers of legislation, contingent upon federal
paramountcy if a conflict between the two arises.Y Essentially, the
federal government enacts the overall immigration policy and the provinc-
es decide how to best implement that policy and attain its stated
goals.' Under the Program, where immigrants are allowed to invest
and the way in which the money is invested is within the realm of pro-
vincial regulation, subject to a few federal limitations. Each province, for
example, has the role of assessing the economic impact of the specific
investment proposals." It is only after the province approves an invest-
ment proposal, that it is referred to the federal government for review."
The federal government will then determine whether the eligible business
or fund "fosters the development of a strong and viable economy and re-
'+ There are two fundamental principals of Canadian administrative law.
(1) There can be no power or authority exercised by an official without a statutory or
a prerogative source, and all grants of power are generally to be narrowly construed. (2)
Where a discretion is granted to an official, the courts will not review his decision on
its merits, but only to see if he stayed within the bounds of his authority and exercised
it in a reasonable manner.
GREY, supra note 26, at 1 (emphasis added).
"6 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (U.K.).
17) In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to ... Immigration into
the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from Time
to Time make Laws in relation to ...Immigration into all or any of the Provinces;
and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to . . .Immigration shall have
effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act
of the Parliament of Canada.
Id. § 95.
7 YOUNG, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note 41, at 21.
'" Provincial guidelines typically identify preferred economic sectors for immigrant
investment. Alberta, for example, encourages investment in manufacturing; tourist facili-
ties; oil and gas ventures; plastics; high technology; forestry; food processing; chemi-
cals; petro chemicals; agribusiness; and value added real estate development. ALBERTA
CAREER DEVEILOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT BRANCH,
BusINEss IMNvIIGRATION PROGRAM, ALBERTA GUIDELINES - INVESTOR CATEGORY, in
PAC. RIM INVEsTmENT & Bus. IMGR. 3.2.23 (Continuing Legal Education Society of
British Columbia, 1989).
'7 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 13.
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Not only did the use of this concept of significant economic contri-
bution introduce an unprecedented level of unpredictability as to whether
funds would be approved,'76 provincial freedom under the Program
heightened competition and induced each province to offer its own
incentives to investors.'77 An uneven and unstable regulatory environ-
17 SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3421.
171 PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46, at 13.
176 Rotenberg Questionnaire, supra note 47.
'77 These incentives come in the form of provincial guidelines which are more or
less stringent depending upon the type of investor it is tying to attract - those seeking
higher returns or those seeking greater stability. As previously noted, however, prov-
inces may not reduce the actual amount of investment by applying governmental subsi-
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ment has resulted. Quebec in particular is seen by many as a "back door"
to Canada because of its eagerness to attract wealthy immigrants and its
unparalleled degree of autonomy in immigration matters."' While all
provinces have the ability to take concurrent legislative power over im-
migration under Section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, only Quebec
has exercised this power and in 1986 established its own ministry for
immigration.1
79
In addition to taking concurrent legislative power over immigration,
all provinces are also able to enter into agreements with the federal
government under the Immigration Act "for the purpose of facilitating the
formulation, coordination and implementation of immigration policies and
programs."'8° Although all provinces except Ontario, British Columbia,
and Manitoba have entered into such agreements with the federal govern-
ment, the Canada-Quebec Accord... (which came into effect in April
1991 and replaced the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978) gave Quebec
unprecedented control over immigration." While other provinces are
dies on top of the immigrant's investment. In most other respects, the provinces have
a broad spectrum of regulatory power. See Fairey, Immigrant Investor Program, in
INBOUND INvEsTMENT INTO CANADA, supra note 14, at 1.3.09-10. Both the Task Force
and the Standing Committee recognize the need to "level the playing field," so that
internal competition does not destroy the Program. See generally INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 9; TASK FORCE supra note 9, at 5-10.
" See, e.g., Yang Questionnaire, supra note 15; Catherine Kentridge, Legal Update:
Immigration Law, CANADIAN LAW., AugdSept. 1993, at 470; Joel Millman, Visas for
Sale, FORBES, Apr. 29, 1991, at 107.
'79 YOUNG, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note 41, at 21.
'm Immigration Act, S.C., ch. 52, § 109(2), 1976-1977 (Can.).
' This agreement came out of Quebec's refusal to sign Canada's constitution
because of its concern for Quebec's ability to preserve its ethnic diversity and unique-
ness. Upon the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, this agreement was enacted to
accomplish what would have taken place in the area of immigration had the Meech
Lake Accord passed. MARAGRET YOUNG, RESEARCH BRANCH OF THE LIBRARY OF
PARLIAMENT, BACKGROUND PAPER NO. BP-25E, IMMIGRATION: THE CANADA-QUEBEC
ACCORD 1 (1991) [hereinafter YOUNG, THE CANADA-QUEBEC ACCORD].
'82 It expressly allows Quebec to choose its immigrants based on cultural and linguistic
considerations alone; it guarantees that Quebec will receive 25% of all immigrants
allowed into Canada in any given year [20% derived from Quebec's share of total
Canadian population and 5% to compensate for Quebec's historic inability to attract
immigrants]; and it grants Quebec a one-third share of Canada's total immigration
budget.
Alice A. Pellegrino, Note, Meech Lake and the Canadian Constitutional Crisis: The
Problem of Provincial Immigration Control in Federalist Nations, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ.
751, 768 (1991) (quoting Christine Tierney, Quebec Gains Control Over Immigration
From Canada, REUTERS NEWS SER., Dec. 28, 1990). See also Montreal Awarded
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able to establish their own guidelines concerning investment proposals,
Quebec not only set up its own Program Guidelines, but it also adopted
its own regulations governing the Program."'
Although Quebec agreed in an annex to the Cullen-Couture Agree-
ment ' 4 to abide by the spirit, if not the letter, of the Program, it none-
theless liberally uses its regulatory power to recruit wealthy immigrants
who would otherwise be unable to enter Canada. It can, for example,
admit any immigrant who passes the medical and security examinations
even if they do not attain the federal government's minimum point
system selection criteria.'85 Quebec's independence from the federal
government allows investors to obtain their required approval at a fraction
of the time than that of other provinces.'86 Also, some immigrant inves-
tors prefer to put money in Quebec because its business immigration pro-
gram allows more direct control of their money, as well as a guarantee
on all investments.'8" The introduction of Tier Ill, the $500,000 category
to the federal Program, was largely the result of pressure from other
provinces for the federal government to compensate for Quebec's ability
to pennit risk-free, guaranteed investments under the oiiginal $250,000 category.'m
Culture Institute, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 23, 1991, at D3.
" Quebec enacted the Regulation Respecting the Selection of Foreign Nationals,
R.R.Q. 1981, c. M-23.1, r. 2 as amended with O.C. 1080-80, G.O.Q., 1986, Part II,
2081. See generally Eliadis, supra note 62.
'8' Annex D has been in effect since January, 1990, and was incorporated into the
CANADA-QUEBEC ACCORD as APPENDIX D. PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note 46,
at 2.
" Quebec has developed its own point system for independent immigrants. While
Quebec's point system has many of the same features as the federal system, it differs
in many respects. Quebec, for example, liberally rewards immigrants with knowledge
of French as well as those who have relatives or friends residing within Quebec with
extra points. YOUNG, CANADA'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note 41, at 21. For
more information about Quebec's authority over other areas of immigration, see
generally YOUNG, THE CANADA-QUEBEC ACCORD, supra note 182.
"16 Fairey, Some Realities of the Investor Programme, in PAC. RIM INVESTMENT &
Bus. IMhIvGR., supra note 60, at 3.2.05. See also Canada, House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evi-
dence, Issue No. 18 (11 June 1992), at 18:63-64 [hereinafter House of Commons, Issue
No. 18].
"s In Quebec, the full investment amount is irrevocably placed in an escrow account
with a securities dealer, which allows the investor to manage the portfolio by investing
in ventures as desired, within broad guidelines. PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1993, supra note
46, at 2.
s Fairey, supra note 60, at 3.2.01. What Quebec believed to be the economic bene-
fit from such a guarantee policy is not clear, but Quebec's investment statistics
improved upon implementation. Even in its present form, offerings under the Tier III
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The problem with policy differentials between provinces is twofold.
First, bureaucratic confusion arises because of overlapping jurisdiction in
immigration matters, leading to inaction and inefficiencies.'89 Second,
such a scheme serves to frustrate both investors who are unable to predict
which "Canadian" immigration law would be applicable" ° and policy
makers whose efforts at fostering greater regional economic development
and job creation are circumvented by provincial regulations.
VIII. REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION
The Constitution Act, 1982 emphasizes that Parliament, together with
the legislatures and federal and provincial governments, is committed to
furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities
among the provinces.19' The Program is one way in which Canada
encourages regional development."9 Bill C-86 failed to correct certain
policy abuses that frustrate regional economic development and job
creation. This problem can be attributed to inter-provincial competition
and, some would argue, to the failure of the tiered investment scheme.
Canadians benefit from Program investment in a number of ways:
fund managers receive a fee based on a percentage of the fund's assets;
eligible Canadian businesses get low-cost capital (e.g., term loans below
the prime interest rate); people with assets to sell often get a higher price
for their companies and real estate; and jobs are created.'93 Incoming
category are still most commonly from Quebec. Id.
"I One recent example was verbalized when consultants recommended to Saskatche-
wan to "take on more responsibility for monitoring and enforcing program regulations
concerning the marketing and investment of funds." The manager for business im-
migration programs for that province said "there's one small problem with that
recommendation. It's a federal matter. We don't have legal jurisdiction to do anything
in the compliance area." Baines, supra note 14, at 32.
"9 See generally C. L. Rotenberg, Conundrum: Hobson's Choice for Investors
(1989), 8 IMMIGR. L. REv.(2d) 99 (1989).
9,(1) without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative
authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and
the provincial governments, are committed to . .. (b) furthering economic development
to reduce disparity in opportunities ....
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. III, § 36.
11 For more information about earlier policies concerning regional economic de-
velopment, see Peter Aucoin & Herman Bakvis, Regional Responsiveness and Gov-
ernment Organization: The Case of Regional Economic Development Policy in Canada,
in REGIONAL RESPONSIVENESS AND THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 51 (Peter
Aucoin ed., 1985).
193 DEIGAN, supra note 163, 409-10.
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immigrant investors are presenting Canada with a fantastic chance to
bolster national economy and spur immense regional growth. Yet, it is
questionable how much regional development has actually been attained
and how many long-term jobs have been created through the Program.
One study raised questions as to the legitimacy of the number of jobs
created (claiming one-third less than what the federal government assert-
ed) and the relevancy of government statistics on the amount of invest-
ment (claiming that less than half of the investments came into Canada
solely as a result of the Program). 94 Others point to Canada's offshore
trust provisions of the Income Tax Act 95 which allow immigrants to
circumvent income tax collection on their wealth for up to five years,
which deprives the national economy of its intended benefit."9 Also, al-
though investments have been made in numerous types of industry, an-
other government study group concluded that a good number of invest-
ments were of questionable value and far too many were in real estate
ventures."
While the 1993 amendments prevent further investment in real estate
acquisition, monitoring of investments should actively be taken up at the
provincial level so that regional agencies can better target growth areas
and ensure that investments actually flow into the province to which they
are intended. 98 This appears to be a problem across Canada, especially
in Tier I provinces where the amount of money constituting the minimum
investment is less. The Manitoba Program auditors, for example, discov-
ered that certain funds made investments outside the province without
governmental approval.'" In particular, the auditors found that one fund
did not initiate any new investments in Manitoba within the fourteen
months preceding the audit.' Instead, all projects focused on opportuni-
"9 LaPointe, supra note 92, at A9.
'g Income Tax Act § 94(1), in 3 Can. Tax Rep. (CCH) 11, 550 (1994).
'9 Tax attorneys claim that Canada's offshore trust provisions of the Income Tax
Act allow immigrants to place all their assets in an offshore trust before they arrive in
Canada, where such assets remain completely untaxed by Canada for five years. After
receiving citizenship (which could occur as soon as five years after gaining permanent
residency), it is possible for these new citizens to live outside Canada to prevent
Canadian taxes from being collected on the initial investment of $500,000. Barbara
Yaffe, They Trust Revenue Canada, VANcOuvER SuN, Nov. 1, 1994, at A13. See also
House of Commons, Issue No. 15, supra note 36, at 15:6, 15:9.
197 TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 51-53. But cf. Interim Report, supra note 9, at 16.
198 TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 33.
'9' Deloitte & Touche, CMLF, supra note 68, at 30.
o Deloitte & Touche, Report on Audit Review of the WinnInvest Capital Corpora-
tion; WinnPacific Capital Corporation; WinnFuture Capital Corporation, IMMIGR.
INVESTOR PROG. REV., Mar. 22, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter Deloitte & Touche,
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ties in British Columbia or the United States. During this time, provincial
approval had never been formally sought, which allowed for profitable
investments to have little effect on the economic development of the
intended province."
The auditors also discovered in an audit of three privately adminis-
tered investment funds controlled by a single manager, that after several
unsuccessful investments in Manitoba, the manager ceased to invest
within the province. At the time of the audit, the manager of these
syndicates operated out of Ontario and had no representative in Manito-
ba.' It is doubtful that significant investment in Manitoba could be
achieved under such a system of operation. Provinces should consider
requiring fund managers to reside within the province of investment.
Also, if the province was obligated to review and provide acceptance
based upon the feasibility of the intended economic benefit to the prov-
ince, it is likely that funds would be maintained and managed within that
province. This would enable more investment opportunities to be found
that would enrich provincial business growth. 3
It has been argued that the Program's tiered system is at the root of
its failure to achieve regional economic gains. A tiered system artificially
redirects funds in a manner contrary to market forces, which some argue
may not necessarily result in "effective or efficient economic development
in Canada of a nature to enable Canada to compete in the world mar-
ket." But despite possible shortcomings, the tiered system has con-
veyed vast benefits to certain provinces which otherwise would not have
been afforded them. Money from the Program is the largest source of
venture capital available in poorer provinces." Saskatchewan, for exam-
ple, with just 1/25th of Canada's population, was able to attract
$464,800,000 in subscriptions between January 1986 and December 31,
WinnFuture].
11 Id. In Saskatchewan, as another example, fund managers of International Capital
Corp. invested immigrant money in development projects in Malaysia and restaurant
chains in the United States. See Baines, Police Digging, supra note 141, at A14.
' Deloitte & Touche, WinnFuture, supra note 200, at 8.
23 Id. at 32-33.
Fairey, supra note 60, at 3.2.03.
In 1992, the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration recog-
nized that over 90% of development capital available in Newfoundland came through
the Program; over 90% in Prince Edward Island; 80% in Nova Scotia; about 60% in
New Brunswick; and 70% in Saskatchewan. Canada, House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence, Issue No. 14 (8 June 1992) at 14:10 [hereinafter House of Commons, Issue
No. 14].
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1993, second only to Quebec.'
Although they receive large quantities of investments, provinces like
Saskatchewan are concerned that investors rarely reside outside British
Columbia, Ontario, or Quebec." 7 More investors living in the province
of investment would improve consumer activity which would increase the
local tax base. While some advocate that investors should be required to
reside in the province of their investment for several years before gaining
permanent residency, it appears that this residency requirement may not
only be unconstitutional, but could also serve to stop investments into
such provinces all together."° While ninety-two percent of the immi-
grant investors choose to live in British Columbia, Ontario, and Que-
bec,' the structure of the Program channels their money to other prov-
inces. Without the Program, it is likely that investors would invest all
their money in the region in which they settle."'
Another concern is that although investment opportunities have been
successfully channeled into poorer provinces through the tiered system,
investments tend to focus on metropolitan areas instead of rural zones
within those provinces." Across Canada, most money is invested in
provincial capitals and urban areas, which shows that there is trouble get-
ting funds to poorer, rural regions. This could be remedied by re-orienting
tiered investments by regional area, not by province, which would ensure
more investment in rural areas." 2 It would also be highly recommended
20' PROGRAM STATISTICS 1993, supra note 67, at schedule V.
Id. at schedule IV.
Chris Varcoe, Selling Saskatchewan: Their Dollars Flow into This Province but
Their Bodies Usually Go Elsewhere, LEADER-POST (Saskatchewan), May 21, 1994.
'09 PROGRAM STATISTICS 1993, supra note 67, at schedule IV.
20 Policy makers insist that one should not look at the investor category separately,
but rather as a complement to the entrepreneur category, providing benefits to those
provinces which have not enjoyed high levels of immigration. House of Commons,
Issue No. 14, supra note 206, at 14:8.
211 TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 30. See also Canada, House of Commons,
Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence, Issue No. 16 (9 June 1992), at 16:8-10 [hereinafter House of Commons,
Issue No. 16].
212 TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 35. Under the current system, for example, the
entire provinces of Ontario and Quebec are in Tier II. But under a regional tiered
system, Ontario's eastern and northern regions would qualify as Tier I, as would Gaspe
and Lac St. Jean, in Quebec. House of Commons, Issue No. 17, supra note 11 at
17:46. Problems would arise, however, if regions crossed provincial borders because
applicable financial legislation is provincially based. Provinces would have to support
the fund jointly for such a regional system to be effective. House of Commons, Issue
No. 14, supra note 206, at 14:26.
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to apply indices of economic disparity to decide if a province should be
in Tier I or Tier II, instead of being based on immigrant landings.213
In addition to improving the tiered system, economic development
could also be gained by fine-tuning the Program to facilitate an increase
in the amount of risk capital flowing to small and medium-sized busi-
nesses.2"4 Investment should be encouraged in higher-risk projects. Cur-
rently, after an investor has received a return on the investment (general-
ly, three percent) and managers collect their fees (generally, four percent),
any remaining profit goes to the investment fund.2"5 This creates an
incentive for money to go towards low-risk projects so that the fund can
realize a greater amount of money as profits.2"6
To aid in encouraging investment into higher risk businesses, Tier HI
investments and Quebec's guarantees should be eliminated from the
Program because while they give the investor confidence in the invest-
ment, such guarantees provide little or no economic benefit to Cana-
da.2" 7 The following quote is particularly illustrative:
The benefit to the "bank" is not having to deploy funds yet still obtain-
ig a spread and additionally possibly pleasing a high net worth client
or potential client. The benefit to the Investor is that he is fully secured.
The effect on the borrower is absolutely neutral or may result in a slight
saving in that the Investor may provide funds at a slightly lower cost
than a "bank" due to the privilege of the visa. The benefit to the prov-
ince or Canada is obscure. No new economic activity is created. The
province does not even necessarily benefit from having the Investor
reside and invest other funds within the province as of course mobility
throughout Canada cannot be restricted.2 8
213 Id.
214 DEIGAN, supra note 163, at 410.
25 Fairey, supra note 60, at 3.2.01-03.
216 Id.
217 TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 53-54. But cf. INTERim REPORT, supra note 9, at
17-18. As Steven Green, Member of the Business Immigration Committee of the
Canadian,Bar Association (Ontario) emphasized:
I submit that you have to look to the practicalities. The practicalities of today's market
state that we need third-party guarantees. The United States of America has now entered
this game; Australia is in the game; Singapore is in the game. People are looking
elsewhere. Perhaps before, Canada was the only alternative. Few countries provided this
type of program and now everyone's in the game. I submit to you that third-party
guarantees are important, that in practical fact there are third-party guarantees and people
have been able to get around them.
HousE OF COMMONS, Issue No. 15, supra note 36, at 15:23.
228 Fairey, supra note 60, at 3.2.01-02.
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The majority of investment subscriptions have gone to Quebec
because of its ability to offer secured investments. It is unfortunate that
the provinces which have abided by the spirit of the Program and used
it as a source of capital in sectors of the economy where capital is
scarce, have in effect been penalized because investors are able to choose
less risky ventures in Quebec." 9
IX. THE "SEAL" OF GOVERNMENT APPROVAL
The 1993 regulations provided further assurances of protection of
Program participants and added transparency of the workings of the
Program. But, some practitioners insist that by merely codifying the
Guidelines, the same loopholes exist for unscrupulous marketing tech-
niques.' It is argued that as the Program is becoming more ingrained
in Canada's immigration program, "it is being upgraded philosophically,
but Canada is not concurrently increasing regulations."' One reason
perhaps is public misperception of the Program's problems.
Contrary to public perception, immigrant investors are protected from
fraud and misrepresentation as well as, if not better than, Canadian
investors.m There are only two notable exceptions which give immi-
grants less protection than resident Canadian investors. First, many
investors are solicited "blind pools" where the investor does not know
how the money will be invested. This practice is not permitted under
most provincial securities laws' except with regard to mutual funds,
2"9 Thomas Questionnaire, supra note 120. As Member of Parliament Simon de Jong
(Regina - Qu'Appelle) remarked before the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment
and Immigration:
What I'm hearing is that Ontario hasn't been able to sell full investment funds since
1990. You have been playing it very conservative, very straight, no special little bells
and whistles and come-ons and suggestions of guarantees and so forth, and others have
not. . . . Others have a lot of the pie and you're not getting anything. Basically what
you're saying is, hey, let's straighten this out.
House of Commons, Issue No. 17, supra note 11, at 17:76. Because of political
sensitivity towards the Province of Quebec, no action is likely to be taken by Ottawa
to level the playing field among provinces.
220 Wai Interview, supra note 124; Green Questionnaire, supra note 168.
22 Wai Interview, supra note 24.
222 Questionnaire completed by Peter D. Fairey, partner with McCarthy & Ttrault,
Vancouver, B.C. (Mar. 21, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fairey Question-
naire].
I One notable exception is Alberta, which lists blind pools on the Alberta Stock
Exchange (ASE). These blind pools, called junior capital pools, were first introduced
to the ASE in 1986. Canada: ASE "Blind Pool" Successes Outweigh the Scams, Flops,
FIN. POST Oct. 15, 1990, at P13.
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for which there are vigorous rules to prevent abuse. 4 The second ex-
ception relates to the fact that marketing takes place in jurisdictions
outside Canada. This is a problem because the Canadian government is
unable to apply its domestic security laws extraterritorially. While it has
been shown that countries like Hong Kong have enacted laws to regulate
marketing activity, they cannot effectively regulate how the money is
used once the investor has decided to invest. Ultimately, however, prob-
lems arise because neither the Canadian government nor the foreign
investor's government reviews the economic feasibility of a given project.
Most immigrant investors encounter difficulties because they have
entered into poor business contracts. Often, the fund or business manager
will have done exactly what he represented he would do in the offering
memorandum, but because of high commission and management fees, and
because of other disclosed factors, success of the project was never likely
to be achieved.2 When money is lost in this fashion, there is no ac-
tionable negligence involved. While immigrant investors may appeal to
the fairness of this situation, these circumstances are similar to resident
Canadian investors who have not carefully analyzed the business terms
under which they have invested. With proper counsel, such foolish
business decisions could have been prevented.' 6 Another possible way
to prevent this situation would be for the Canadian government to impose
a cap on the amount of commission an agent can earn, so that an invest-
ment will be sold on its merits not the kick-back received.227
Prospective investors get inundated by the promotional activities of
the business or fund in their home country. Seminars are often held by
investment dealers in Asia to outline the Program and possible investment
opportunities.' 8 These seminars, however, often focus on a sales pitch
for Canada itself, including emphasis on Canadian lifestyles, political
climate, homes, education, and scenery rather than the fine print of the
,, Fairey Questionnaire, supra note 222. See Haslam v. Haslam, 114 D.L.R. 4th 562
(Ont. 1994) (emphasizing that only certain federal acts allow for investment in mutual
funds and that these investments can only be made by institutions that are subject to
governmental regulation).
Fairey Questionnaire, supra note 222.
z See Wyng Chow, Group Gives Newcomers Guidance: Immigrant Investment,
VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 10, 1994, at Dl.
m Thomas Questionnaire, supra note 120. The range of an agent's fee is between
$3,000 and $18,000 per subscription secured. House of Commons, Issue No. 15, supra
note 36, at 15:31.
' Gordon Jaremko, Fresh Start: Jim Louie's Passion is to Ensure Everything's on
the Up-and-Up When Immigrant Investors Come to Canada, CALGARY HERALD, Sept.
13, 1993, at Cl.
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business proposals. 229 Potential immigrants are also often not told the
specifics of Canada's immigration laws, such as the strict law that per-
manent residency will be lost if the person resides outside of Canada for
more than 183 days per year. Overall, there seems to be a lack of
governmental responsibility attached to the marketing of investment
opportunities because of the inability of its laws to apply
extraterritorially. ° It has been the Canadian government's presumption
that prospective investors are knowledgeable business people. As such, it
is believed that the requirement of complete disclosure of material facts
in the offering memorandum allows the investor ample opportunity to
attain all relevant information.'2'
The problem is that because the Canadian government gives each
available business or fund its initial approval, many investors look no
further. Immigrants often do not realize that this approval carries no
weight with it. Investors are under the "illusion that the programs are
very 'safe' since they are government-approved (or worse still that they
are 'guaranteed' by the Federal Government)."' 2  Despite the media
exposure that has been centered on mismanaged investment opportunities,
many investors still believe that because the investment is governmentally
approved in Canada, there is no need to have investment counsel deter-
mine the economic soundness of the project.1 3
One of two options needs to be enacted for the Program to effective-
ly neutralize the persistent illusion of a governmental seal of approval: (1)
the government could discontinue looking at the investment proposals and
cease to give its approval to funds; or (2) the government could continue
to give its seal of approval, yet begin regulating the Program more
efficiently. The United States has chosen not to regulate its Investor's
Visa Program. 4 It is the American belief that market forces take care
Id.; House of Commons, Issue No. 17, supra note 11, at 17:49.
o This comes in part from the uneven regulatory scheme which has developed
through Canada's overlapping provincial and federal authority. The provincial govern-
ments insist it is the federal government's responsibility, but the federal government
does not have the expertise to police the funds for immigrant investors. Kentridge,
supra note 179, at 47.
SOR/93-412, 1993, C. Gaz. Part II, 3410, 3460.
22 Yang Questionnaire, supra note 15.
The prevalence of this illusion is seen by the Hong Kong Securities & Futures
Commission's warning to Hong Kong citizens in 1989: "The fact that a government or
regional authority in an overseas country has approved a scheme for linkage to immi-
gration does not necessarily indicate that the investment itself has been subjected to
detailed scrutiny by that Government or authority." SFC Press Release, supra note 124,
at 3.1.09.
' See generally Robert L. DeMoss II, Citizenship for Sale or Incentive for
[Vol. 27:359
IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAM
of problems such as misrepresentation and fraud. In the United States,
fund managers present an offering memorandum and investors take it to
their financial advisors who look at its legitimacy. Investors do not
automatically assume that the project is good, because it carries no
governmental approval"s Market forces could similarly eliminate prob-
lems with the Canadian program.
If, however, Canada chooses the second option and continues to
approve investment opportunities, Bill C-86 was not enough to make the
Program run effectively. Changes that should be targeted include the
enactment of off-shore monitoring and regulations. 6 It would not be
advisable to prohibit marketing activity from occurring abroad, because it
is unlikely that many of the prospective investors would travel to Canada
to choose an appropriate investment. 7 While it would be difficult for
Canadian policy makers to protect investors extraterritorially without
harming the marketing efforts of Canadian businesses or funds, some
protection is needed.
The government needs to analyze its options because as the Program
is currently structured, it appears that on ethical and moral grounds, or
perhaps implied contract theory, the government should be responsible for
its approval of the projects. 8 As one investor in Western Canadian
asserted, "[t]he government was not responsible for our loss, but we feel
the government had an obligation to ensure the honesty of the fund's
management." 9
Economic Development? The New Foreign Investment and Immigration Category, 38
FED. B. NEws & J. 442 (Oct. 1991) (describing the United States' foreign investment
and immigration category).
"s Wai Interview, supra note 124.
2M Id.
7 Fairey Questionnaire, supra note 223. Others insist that if investors were given
conditional visas allowing entry for several months in order to find an appropriate
investment (based upon the system used for entrepreneurs), participants would still
invest and all marketing strategies would be under Canadian control. House of Com-
mons, Issue No. 15, supra note 36, at 15:24.
" Wai Interview, supra note 124. Cecil Rotenberg has remarked, "[i]s government
liable? ...They sure are. Anybody with gumption enough to sue them should be able
to recover." Reiman, supra note 76, at 54. See also Kentridge, supra note 179.
" Swardson, supra note 11. In another situation, the federal government approved
the amendment of an offering memorandum to permit the immediate release of funds,
instead of waiting until all subscriptions were made and visas were issued for all
investors. Investors were never told of this change, which led one investor to note that
"an immigrant investor program without the contingency of the issuance of the visa is
just a regular investor program. . . .Your branch owes investors an explanation on
why your branch made such an approval and what was the back-up to protect investors
1995]
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The outcome of such suits would depend upon which grounds the
investors are suing. Most arguments, such as failure to perform proper
due diligence before approving funds,2" are likely to fail because when
these projects are approved, the federal and provincial governments
require the signing of a waiver of government responsibility. "It is a
buyer beware situation essentially, and the compliance with the full
disclosure documentation should be sufficient for the sophisticated inves-
tor."24' There may be other grounds upon which to bring suit. Recent
cases unrelated to the Program indicate that investors might be successful
under a claim of breach of statutory duty.2 42
One might query why there are no law suits against the government
and few suits against funds and/or fund managers. Before Bill C-86 there
were no regulations that could be enforced. Also, it must be remembered
that an immigrant has an overriding concern of getting a visa and becom-
ing a permanent resident. If one's money is still in escrow because the
minimum offering has not yet been met or because it has been frozen due
to a governmental investigation, a visa has not yet been issued.243 Only
after the immigrant receives residency are lawsuits likely to be
brought.244 Another problem for troubled investors is that the Canadian
Privacy Ac 245 does not permit the government to release the names of
other investors in the same fund. This is considered financial information
that must remain confidential after disclosed to the government by the
fund managers. This law thus frustrates an immigrant's ability to
in the event investors could not get visas." David Baines, Loose Moose Jaw Dealings
Leave Investors Out in Cold, VANCOUVER SUN, May 28, 1994, at C5.
20 As Member of Parliament, Simon de Jong (Regina - Qu'Appelle) postulated
before the Standing Committee on Labour, Employment and Immigration, "[clan the in-
vestors . . . then take the government to court, saying that due diligence has not been
observed, that the immigration department has only six people, totally inadequate? They
are rubber-stamping [these investment funds]." House of Commons, Issue No. 16, supra
note 212, at 16:26.
24 Id. at 16:27. But "not even a sophisticated investor can protect himself from a
lie. And it's not completely a caveat investor situation because there is federal and
provincial approval." Kentridge, supra note 179, at 48.
242 Consider the implications of Comeau's Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans) (T.D.) 3 F.C. 54 (1992) and Kealey v. Canada (Attorney
General) 1 F.C. 195 (1992), where the government was held liable on the theory of
breach of statutory duty.
21 PROGRAM GUIDELINEs 1993, supra note 46, at 3. The suit involving Western Ca-
nadian was brought after most investors had received their visas and were assured that
the suit would not affect their immigrant status. Yeung Interview, supra note 11.
24 Wai Interview, supra note 124.
24 Privacy Act, S.C., ch. 111 (1980-1983) (Can.).
241 Thomas Questionnaire, supra note 120; House of Commons, Issue No. 15, supra
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bring an effective class action suit, which while not the fault of the
Program's drafters, is nonetheless a concern for potential investors that
should be recognized.
Even if investors do not find adequate grounds to bring suit against
the government, federal and provincial governments should recognize a
moral obligation to improve the Program so that Canada's credibility in
the international market is strengthened. The Program should not merely
"sell" visas to unwitting immigrants. Rather, money should be placed into
fair investments that will give the immigrant a return on the investment
and a favorable impression that would facilitate future business transac-
tions in Canada. If handled properly, the immigrant's investment would
be the first, not the last, investment made in the Canadian economy.247
X. CONCLUSION
When the investor category was created in 1986, it was anticipated
that capital would be channeled into Canadian businesses, jobs would be
created, and provincial industrial and economic development would be
increased, thereby fulfilling one of the primary objectives of Canada's
immigration policy: "to foster the development of a strong and viable
economy and the prosperity of all regions of Canada."' Assuredly,
these goals have been achieved to a certain extent and Canada has
benefitted from the Program. Federal statistics show that immigrant
investors with personal funds totaling $6.8 billion - the highest amount on
record - came into Canada in 1993.249
Although investors and their dependents accounted for only five
percent of all immigrant landings in 1993,"o the economic impact they
provided is obviously considerable. From the Program's inception in
January 1986 to December 31, 1993, Quebec has received the largest
share of investment, at 30.7%; Saskatchewan received 20.5%; British
Columbia received 11.8%; and Manitoba received 9.7% of the total
distribution of subscribed funds."'
note 36, at 15:17; House of Commons, Issue No. 16, supra note 212, at 16:28.
24 "That's what this program is really all about. It's a short-term economic
development financing program, but it should be a long-term trade and investment
linkage program for Canada and for the rest of the world." House of Commons, Issue
No. 18, supra note 187, at 18:16.
24 Immigration Act, S.C., ch. 52, § 3(h), 1976-1977 (1976) (Can.).
24 PROGRAM STATISTICS 1993, supra note 67, at schedule I. The amount of money
is calculated as "the total amount of money the family has available for settlement in
Canada. This is the total of funds already transferred, to be transferred, and those
which will be in possession on arrival." Id.
SId.
5' Id. at graph IV. Nova Scotia received 7.5%; Prince Edward Island 5.4%; Ontario
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Since the Program's inception, Canada has attracted investments
totaling more than $2.25 billione 2 and the government estimates that the
Program created approximately 14,300 jobs by December 31, 1993.
Garment factories, jewelry stores, hotels and other hospitality develop-
ments, electronics companies, plastics plants, motion picture distribution
companies, fish-processing plants, horse-breeding farms, and film pro-
cessing shops are just a sampling of the approved businesses into which
immigrants have investede 4 - all of which increased provincial economic
growth and helped create diversification from provincial single commodity
economies. 5 Important intangible benefits also flow from this program.
People come to Canada with a unique knowledge of international business
and foreign languages and cultures that add a new dimension to how
Canadian businesses operate in a global economy. 6 In addition to
money invested through the Program, it has been estimated that each
investor typically has a net worth of two million dollars for personal use
in such expenditures as homes, cars, securities, or businesses. 7 With
the possibility of such a large influx of new capital, it is understandable
why keen competition has developed among provinces to attract immi-
grant investors.
High profile cases of mismanagement have made nations around the
world aware of Canada's Investor category for business immigration. The
shortcomings of the Canadian system have been laid bare, but the poten-
tial for great economic benefit is also obvious. Questions are now being
asked about the Program which need to be answered for Canada. These
Program changes will undoubtedly become the centerpiece of political
discussions in countries which have recently enacted business immigration
programs, such as the United States and Mexico, as well as nations such
as Australia and New Zealand with already well-established investor
programs."8 It is important for Canada to improve the attractiveness of
4.8%; Alberta and New Brunswick each received 3.7%; Newfoundland 2%; and
Yukon/Northwest Territories received 0.2% of the total distribution of subscribed funds.
Id.
252 Id. at schedule V.
3 Id. This figure does not include jobs created in the province of Quebec.
2 See generally DERMONT & FENNELL, supra note 35. Specifically, 33.8% of
investment went into the accommodation, food and beverage service industry; 21.6% in
the construction industry; 13.9% in the manufacturing industry; and 7.8% was invested
in the finance and insurance industry. Quebec totals were not included in these per-
centages. PROGRAM STATIsTIcs 1993, supra note 67, at schedule VII.
25 DERMONT & FENNELL, supra note 35, at 20.
z House of Commons, Issue No. 14, supra note 206, at 14:10.
House of Commons, Issue No. 17, supra note 11, at 17:93.
Interim Report, supra note 9, at 5. For comparison on the U.S. and Australian
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the Program to ensure its longevity in an increasingly competitive interna-
tional market. As the House of Commons interim report concluded, "The
Program represents an enormous economic development opportunity for
Canada. Rather than abandoning or stifling the opportunity due to diffi-
culties in its realization, there is an obligation to address the problems
and improve the Program for the economic benefit of Canada." 9
To be a continued success for the Canadian people, the federal
government must make decisions regarding its goals and priorities for the
Program. If sectoral development is important, reforms will need to be
enacted to ensure regional economic growth. The government may also
wish to address social issues of cultural integration of new immigrants
which would lessen tension upon landing. As confirmed by the 1994
moratorium, the Canadian government believes that further structural
changes are needed. One hopes that comprehensive revisions, not merely
cosmetic changes, are made to the Program before its reinstatement in
1996. Policy makers should strive to enforce governmental monitoring of
investment money, dispel the illusion of a government guarantee, and
ensure greater regional economic development. If these refinements are
accomplished, the Immigrant Investor Program's tarnished image may be
restored in time and all Canadians could more equally share in the
benefits of the Program.
investor programs, see generally Catherine R. Giella, Visas for Sale: A Comparison of
the U.S. Investor Provision with the Australian Business Migration Program, 13 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 209 (1992).
"' Interim Report, supra note 9, at 22.
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